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Abstract 
In this thesis, two serious accidents and one major incident in the offshore drilling industry 
have been studied and compared. The main objective of this study was to seek out common 
organizational factors that contributed to these accidents. The findings clearly demonstrated 
that commonalities exist. Essentially, five factors represent recurring elements in these 
accidents: management, communication, competence, procedures, and compliance. How 
the regulatory regimes were organized also contributed to the accidents. These 
commonalities are important to examine so as to learn from mistakes that have already 
been made.  
The importance of learning after an accident is not related to learning everything there is to 
know about the accident, but to organizations’ willingness to accept that they actually have 
something to learn and that a need exists to act more safely in the future (Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997). 
A shift in how we think about safety in the offshore industry is needed―where safety is not 
just something kept in mind, but rather the top priority. This shift should be facilitated by 
both the authorities and the industry as a whole. One cannot separate safety from other 
issues in the organization; however, safety is essential and applies to management, 
communication, compliance, procedures, competence, and regulatory regimes. 
In this thesis, an analytical framework has been used to structure and compare the different 
accidents/incident. The main finding reflects the fact that to achieve an output that ensures 
both production and safety, there is a need to increase awareness of the process an 
organization goes through within its lifetime. This means that every organization goes 
through a drifting process where the kind of logic of action taken depends on the context of 
the organization, the tightness of the couplings, and the complexity of the situation. To what 
degree do the different subunits, which evolve in every organization, have their own logic of 
action (i.e., their own way of doing things)? The drifting process both affects and is affected 
by the management structure, the way in which communication systems function, the kinds 
of competence possessed, and whether it is possible to comply with organizational 
procedures and whether these procedures are in accordance with regulatory requirements. 
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Finally, how the regulatory regimes in the different regions are organized varies, and no 
system is perfect. What is essential is the relationship between the regulator and the 
regulated organization. All parties are served by a good relationship because such a 
relationship contributes to achieving the common goal of being a financially sustainable 
organization and maintaining a high level of safety. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
The three accidents that have been analyzed and compared include the blowout in the 
Macondo well on the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico, the oil leak of Montara 
VHP in Australia, and an incident with loss of well control on the Gullfaks C platform well 
34/10 – C – 06A in Norway.   
The in-common characteristics of these accidents are that both technical and organizational 
explanations were used to describe why they happened. Even though these explanations 
varied from accident to accident, some key organizational factors constituted the constant 
variable. In addition, organizational factors that led to the accidents are likely to have played 
a part in other accidents in this industry. This thesis will focus on these organizational 
factors.   
Unfortunately, the accidents under study were not unique, which means that similar 
accidents happened both before and after these accidents. The claim in this thesis is that in-
common organizational factors need to be addressed. The relevant commonalities are 
management, communication, competence, procedures, and compliance. An industry with 
great faith in technology will normally consider technological solutions to be lessons from 
past accidents and incidents. Given the great technological developments over the last 
decades, this might be with good reason. The problem is that the focus on leadership, 
communication, procedures, competence, and compliance has suffered as a result. Thus, in 
addition to analyzing and identifying organizational commonalities, the thesis aims to 
provide deeper insight into them.  
An important contextual factor to in these cases is that three different regulatory regimes 
were involved due to the accidents’ different global locations. Thus, it is of interest to 
determine whether and how different regulatory regimes affected the organizations 
involved. How might different regulatory regimes have had a positive or negative effect on 
the development of these accidents? How did the organizations implement regulatory safety 
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requirements? How well suited were the requirements, how transferable were they, and 
how was the relationship between the regulatory regimes and the organizations involved? 
Were there any similarities despite the different locations and can we learn something from 
such similarities? 
The main objective of this study was to seek an answer to why accidents occur and to 
determine how we can learn from accidents so that that the chance of recurrence decreases. 
Since specific organizational factors were key elements in all the accidents, studying these 
factors is essential.   We need to keep in mind the relationships among technical, 
organizational, and human factors, as well as how these relationships play a key role and 
affect the ways in which the organization thinks about and addresses risk and safety issues.  
This study involved a document analysis of the three cases based on extensive inquiry 
reports or research studies after the accidents/incident. This will be explained more 
thoroughly in Chapter 3, Methods. 
On the basis of these reports, the following research questions will be analyzed:  
1) How did different underlying organizational factors affect the occurrence of these 
accidents? 
2) In what way did the organizational factors affect the accidents, and how did 
interaction among them increase the chances for such accidents to occur? 
3)  How did the different regulatory regimes influence the organizations’ handling of 
safety and risk? 
Understanding organizations’ interaction, both internal and external, is important in 
understanding the whole picture. Organizations are complex units that operate in a world of 
other organizations, regulatory regimes, and similar structures. In answering the research 
questions of this thesis, five organizational factors will be discussed; all played a key role in 
the occurrence of the studied accidents. The research questions are upward and downward, 
which means that both searching for answers in the hierarchy with the regulatory regimes 
on top and seeking answers within the organization might yield a better understanding of 
3 
 
the interaction among the factors. This process also addresses how the different 
organizational factors interact and amplify the chances for accidents to occur. 
While analyzing and answering these questions, an analytical framework (see Figure 1) was 
used as the main analysis tool. This analytical framework was developed by the International 
Research Institute of Stavanger (IRIS); it generally provides for a more thorough comparison 
of different cases and provides a better understanding of how different organizational 
aspects and regulatory regimes interact. This analysis model will be presented in Chapter 4, 
Theory, and the strengths and weaknesses of this type of analysis will be presented in 
Chapter 3, Methodology.  
1.1 The three accidents 
 
There were multiple reasons for choosing these accidents as cases for this thesis. The 
accidents occurred in a high-risk industry where the potential for major accidents is present 
at all times. This in itself is interesting because one primary industry objective is to avoid 
accidents. Also of interest is looking at three accidents that occurred for different reasons 
and carried different extents of damage specifically to find organizational similarities. The 
fact that the accidents occurred in different parts of the world and under different 
regulatory regimes makes this task particularly contributory. We can now examine how the 
context within different types of regulatory regimes might affect the industry, and vice 
versa. Though the accidents differed in their severity, they were similar on some level and 
the chances for a full-scale disaster were present in all three. The purpose of selecting these 
three cases was to show that despite their differences, many similarities concerning the 
underlying organizational factors existed. These factors and their similarities have been 
analyzed and discussed in this paper.  
In the next sections, the accidents are described briefly. Chapter 5 contains a more thorough 
discussion of the accidents and relevant organizational theory.  
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1.1.1 Macondo 
The blowout in the Gulf of Mexico on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig took place on April 
20, 2010, and was a human, economic, and environmental disaster. Eleven men were killed 
and others were seriously injured, more than four million barrels of oil leaked into the Gulf, 
and the economic losses were in the tens of billions of dollars. 
About 126 people were onboard the platform when the accident occurred. Multiple 
organizations had personnel involved on the rig and with this drilling operation. Among the 
organizations involved were BP, operator of the rig, Transocean, and Halliburton.  “The 
Macondo blowout was the product of several individual missteps and oversights by BP, 
Halliburton, and Transocean, which government regulators lacked the authority, the 
necessary resources, and the technical expertise to prevent” (National Commission, 
2011:115).  
The immediate cause of the blowout was a failure to contain hydrocarbon pressure in the 
well. The blowout preventer (BOP) also failed to seal the well after the hydrocarbons flowed 
uncontrolled into the well.  In addition, some have claimed that the cementing was not 
proper. Cement has the barrier function of isolating the hydrocarbon zones (BP, 2010: 33). 
“Halliburton was hired to perform the cementing work in different parts of the drilling 
process. Cementation, however, required extensive calculations along the way. These were 
taken onshore by experts in Halliburton” (Ryggvik, 2012:86). 
As the BP inquiry report stated, the cause of the accident was complex and involved 
“mechanical failures, human judgments, engineered design, operational implementation and 
team interaction came together to allow the initiation and escalation of the Deep Water 
Horizon accident” (BP, 2010:31).  
 
1.1.2 Montara WHP 
The blowout on Montara Wellhead Platform (WHP) occurred on August 21, 2009. In this 
accident, no one was killed but the oil spill was major.  For more than 10 weeks, oil and gas 
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flowed into the Timor Sea just a couple of kilometers from the northwest Australian 
coastline.   
Several organizations were also involved with this West Atlas-owned platform and this 
specific well: the operator PTT Exploration and Production Australia (PTTEPA), West Atlas – 
the rig owner, and Halliburton (Montara Commission, 2010).  
The immediate cause of this accident was that hydrocarbons entered the well in the 9-⅝” 
casing where the primary barrier in the well – a 9-⅝” cemented casing shoe – failed 
(Montara Commission, 2010).  High pressure inside the well and a hole in the 13-⅜” 
casing, which was part of the common barrier element, also contributed. The leakage 
indicated that the losses to the formation had gone through this hole, down through the 
cement in the B-annulus, and out into the formation at the 20" shoe where the 
formation had fractured due to the high pressure. The casing as a common barrier element 
for the primary and secondary well barrier thereby failed (Montara Commission, 2010). 
1.1.3 Gullfaks C 
The incident on the Gullfaks C platform happened in Well 34/10 – C – 06A on May 19, 2010, 
in the Norwegian North Sea. A disaster like the Macondo blowout was only avoided by 
chance. Because of its lesser severity, Gullfaks C is called an incident instead of accident. No 
lives were lost and no damage to the environment occurred: “The difference between 
accidents and incidents is a question of severity or seriousness of the outcome…what 
determines the difference is thus to some degree subjective” (Hollnagel, 2004:20). “The 
importance of making the distinction is that an incident generally is understood as an event 
that might have progressed to become an accident, but which for one reason or another did 
not do so” (Hollnagel, 2004:21). About 86 people were onboard the platform during the 
incident, and both Statoil, the operator, and Seawell were organizations involved on the 
platform and in the drilling operation of this well.  
According to the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority, the immediate cause of this 
incident was a total loss of well control: “Planning of well C-06A on the Gullfaks A began in 
2008. The original well bore was plugged back in the late fall of 2009 and drilling activity in 
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the sidetrack was initiated in December 2009. Based on the measured strength of the 
formation Statoil decided to drill the last part of the well by means of pressure-balanced 
drilling technology (or managed pressure drilling, MPD). Statoil experienced more incidents 
of instability during drilling of the well, and eventually got an event with the total loss of well 
control on 19.5.2010” (PSA, 2010:1). 
 
1.2 Commonalities 
 
Despite differences among the accidents, the aim from here on out is to present their 
commonalities, commonalities that contributed to these accidents.  These commonalities 
include the following underlying organizational factors: management, communication, 
competence, procedure, and compliance. 
The research was intended to answer the following questions: How did these common 
underlying organizational factors affect the occurrence of these accidents? How did they 
interact and amplify the development of these accidents? How did the regulatory regimes 
ultimately affect the organizations involved?  
To answer these questions, document analysis was employed and multiple reports written 
on the accidents were thoroughly studied. The analysis tool was the analytical framework 
developed by IRIS. A detailed account of the method is provided in Chapter 3, Methodology.   
 
1.3 Different regulatory regimes 
 
Different regulatory regimes affect the formation of accidents. This fact makes it interesting 
to discuss how the different regimes studied in this thesis affected the organizations 
involved. Therefore, there exists the need to clarify what characterizes each of the regimes 
and their way of interacting with the industry. All of the regulatory regimes have, of course, 
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evolved over time and been influenced by their own culture and history. “The level of 
qualification and accuracy of the regulator and their willingness to intervene may be 
affected by historical and more subjective factors” (Ryggvik, 2012:148). 
1.3.1 Norwegian regulation 
The Norwegian regulation system is generally recognized for its three-party cooperation. It is 
unique in that the government, the employer(s), and the employees cooperate. The 
operator and suppliers involved play the employer role and all employees have both a right 
and a duty to contribute. Employers and employees are also represented in different unions. 
The government is represented by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA). PSA is a 
regulatory body under the ministry of labor and has regulatory responsibility for safety, 
emergency response, and the working environment in the petroleum industry. The 
Norwegian petroleum sector is governed by a framework directive that has four underlying 
regulations with functional requirements. This means that organizations are free to choose 
between alternative solutions, rather than following detailed requirements. The intention 
was to make the regulations functional, not filled with burdensome requirements. The 
industry itself has a duty to undertake risk assessments, contingency plans, and similar 
measures to ensure that industry organizations operate safely and within the regulatory 
framework. Exactly how to implement the various framework requirements is more or less 
up to the individual organizations, but they must implement internal controls to ensure that 
they meet the requirements established by the authorities and the organizations 
themselves. In other words, the industry itself has a responsibility to ensure compliance with 
regulations. PSA is just a supplement to, not a substitute for, the organizations’ own work 
concerning risk assessment and the planning/implementing of safe operations.  
1.3.2 US regulation 
The Macondo accident led to several changes in the US regulation system for the offshore 
drilling industry. Until the Macondo accident, the Mineral Management Service (MMS) was 
the regulatory institution: “MMS was the federal agency primarily responsible for leasing, 
safety, environmental compliance, and royalty collection from offshore drilling. In carrying 
out its duties, MMS subjected oil and gas activities to an array of prescriptive safety 
regulations: hundreds of pages…” (National Commission, 2011:68). After the accident, MMS 
8 
 
was split into three institutions: Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement, and Office of Natural Resources Revenue (National 
Commission, 2011). The institution responsible for industry safety issues is now the Bureau 
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), which has responsibility for ensuring 
regulatory compliance within the industry. Its key functions are divided into divisions― 
Offshore Regulatory Program, Oil Spill Response, Environmental Compliance― and it 
operates the National Training Center, among other units. BSEE is responsible for safety 
offshore in both drilling and production. It is headquartered in Washington, DC, from which 
national programs, policy, and budget are managed, and has several regional offices. The 
regional offices are responsible for reviewing applications for permits to drill to ensure that 
all the recently implemented enhanced safety requirements are met, conducting inspections 
of drilling rigs and production platforms, and investigating accidents and incidents. The 
American regulation system concerning the petroleum industry differs from the Norwegian 
system in both philosophy and practice. In contrast to the Norwegian system, the US system 
is based on a behavior-based philosophy, where individuals are focused when finding 
solutions and when casting blame (Ryggvik, 2012). Also, a significant difference between the 
systems is the prescriptive, detailed rules and regulations that characterize the US system. 
Another contrast to the Norwegian system is that there is no involvement of employees at 
key decision levels and no demand that the industry itself be responsible for conducting 
internal control. BSEE is authorized to suspend operations, cancel leases, and impose other 
remedies and penalties.  After investigations of accidents/incidents, BSEE is responsible for 
taking appropriate action to prevent recurrence and to enhance safety and environmental 
protection.  
1.3.3 Australian regulation 
The Australian authority for the petroleum industry is the National Offshore Petroleum 
Safety Authority (NOPSA). NOPSA’s responsibilities include the regulation of occupational 
health and safety, wells, and well operations and the structural integrity of facilities and 
environmental management within commonwealth waters. NOPSA has developed 
complicated yet functional regulations, and most responsibility is assigned to operators and 
employers; they are required to take all reasonable practicable steps to protect the health 
and safety of the facility workforce (Montara Commission, 2010). The operator and drilling 
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contractor are responsible for having a so-called safety case, which must be approved by 
NOPSA and renewed every fifth year.  Unlike the Norwegian and US systems, NOPSA has no 
operational authority, but provides recommendations to the Ministry. According to law, 
NOPSA is obligated to inspect every installation once a year based on its safety case.  
Several regulators are involved at different stages in the offshore petroleum fields in 
Australia. In addition to NOPSA, the Northern Territory Department of Resources (NT DoR) 
“was responsible for oversighting the requirements bearing on the integrity of the H1 Well, 
including the general requirement that good oilfield practice be followed” (Montara 
Commission, 2010:12).  
To take part in offshore drilling, companies must address systems and procedures in a Well 
Operation Management Plan (WOMP) and a Drilling Program, both of which must be 
approved by the regulator. Detailed reports to the regulator about well operation are also 
required (Montara Commission, 2010).  
1.4 Limitations 
 
It has been necessary to refine this thesis to concentrate on the research questions. Even 
though the thesis revolves around an industry of technology, the focus will not be on the 
technical elements of the accidents/incident besides definitions and explanations that might 
facilitate understanding of the discussion.  
Priorities have been established so as to answer the research questions in the best possible 
way. In other words, additional organizational factors could have been drawn upon, but 
those chosen stood out as significant commonalities. Also, the extent to which the 
regulatory regimes are discussed also has been limited to keep the focus on the selected 
organizational factors. However, the regulatory regimes are a significant element in the 
analysis model and, as a contextual frame, provide the thesis with fertile ground for 
discussion.  
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2.0 Theory 
 
This chapter presents theory relevant to this research. First is a presentation of the analytical 
framework, developed by IRIS, used as the main analytical tool. The reason for presenting 
this model at the starting point of the chapter is to show how the theory is applied to the 
framework and how it strengthens the understanding of how this framework was used.  
The framework combines the regulatory regime, the organizational factors (management, 
communication, compliance, procedures, and competence), and Snook’s Practical Drift (PD) 
theory.  The four different stages presented in PD (‘Designed,’. ‘Engineered’, Applied’, and 
‘Failed’)  are essential to the study of how different organizational factors interact and affect 
the organization and how they move the organization in the direction of higher risk potential 
and greater possibilities for accidents (see Figure 1). Different logics of action are used in the 
different stages, which ultimately affect whether procedures are followed or whether 
different subunits in the organization develop their own way of doing things. A more 
thorough explanation of practical drift can be found in section 2.1, Understanding accidents. 
 
Figure 1. Governance Structure and PD model (IRIS, 2011:16). 
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PD theory is based on the Normal Accident Theory (NAT) proposed by Perrow (1985) and the 
High Reliability Theory (HRO), which will be accounted for a bit later, but first a short 
introduction to the model is needed. Practical drift’s main objective is to capture both 
contextual and temporal factors when explaining why incidents and accidents occur. To 
capture these factors, Snook introduced three dimensions in the model: situational 
couplings, logics of action, and time. Situational couplings include tight and loose couplings 
and the way in which an organization shifts between the two. Logics of action refer to how 
organizational subunits do their work based on their own logic of action. Time in this context 
refers to the lifespan of the organization, where the organization shifts between loose and 
tight couplings and different logics of action.  
 
2.1 Understanding accidents 
 
This main objective of the thesis was to understand how organizational factors contribute to 
accidents like these and to seek answers that could decrease the possibility for offshore 
drilling incidents/accidents to end in disaster.  NAT and HRO are central in discussions of 
whether accidents could have been avoided; as mentioned above, Snook combined these 
theories in his Practical Drift theory.  Both HRO and NAT acknowledge that the world is 
complex, unstable, unknowable, and unpredictable, but they offer different perspectives on 
how to handle this world.  NAT focuses on the level of complexity and the tightness of 
coupling in an organization. NAT sees accidents as inevitable if complexity is high and 
couplings are tight, such as in the nuclear industry. If you have these sorts of industries, 
accidents will happen. To prevent accidents, organizations must decrease the complexity 
and loosen up tight couplings. They cannot build in more risk barriers because such barriers 
would only increase complexity (Perrow, 1985). HRO, on the other hand, claims that 
organizations can act to prevent accidents, even in high-risk industries. HRO theorists 
describe a number of different strategies for developing highly reliable organizations, where 
collective mindfulness is the key. Weick described five steps involved in developing a 
collective mindfulness: 1) preoccupation with failure, 2) reluctance to simplify 
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interpretations, 3) sensitivity to operations, 4) commitment to resilience, and 5) under 
specification of structures (Weick et al., 1999:91).  
Based on these theoretical perspectives and the analytical framework, how organizations 
shift from being highly reliable, complex, and tightly coupled is an essential aspect to this 
discussion. In addition, understanding how these shifts affect the organizational factors 
studied (i.e., how competence is used to execute one’s job, how one communicates 
vertically and horizontally, how management handles different situations, how well 
compliance procedures are followed) is critical  
Snook’s (2000) PD theory (see Figure 2) emphasizes how different degrees of mindfulness 
depend on different situations and contexts and how organizational systems develop 
between tight and loose couplings over their lifetime. Organizations are not static but rather 
dynamic and are always in development, even if not making a radical change. Acquiring new 
equipment, a new leader, new colleagues, or new procedures, and making similar small and 
large changes, have some effect on each organization. Even type of operation, situation, and 
context can increase and decrease complexity and/or tighten or loosen couplings. In other 
words, each organization is both tightly and loosely coupled and has both high and low 
complexity. This is important to keep in mind when studying these three accidents and the 
organizations involved.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Practical Drift Model. 
The first box shown in Figure 2 (Design) refers to when the organization is characterized by 
top-down management with a focus on procedures and routines to prevent incidents from 
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occurring. Tight couplings refer to Perrow’s (1985) characteristics of high risk and show the 
need for a ruled-based logic of action.  
The second box (Engineered) reflects a shift to an operational situation, a more loosely 
coupled situation. Problems occur if organizations continue to practice a rule-based logic of 
action and top-down management, which may not be necessary in this period of time for 
specific operations or degrees of complexity. In an operational situation, workers with the 
appropriate competence can be allowed a more mindful approach to their work task, where 
those with task expertise are trusted to do the work and the hierarchy is flattened.  This is 
referred to in the third box (Applied), which Snook called practical, drift. Practical drift occurs 
when an organization becomes detached from the rationality referred to in the design stage; 
subunits develop with their own rationality. Based on the units’ own competence, they drift 
away from rule-based logic of action and toward task-based logic of action.  Dangerous 
situations are associated with the fourth box (Failed), when the organization suddenly and 
within a short time shifts back to a tight coupling. The organization does not manage to shift 
back to rule-based logic of action, but rather continues with task-based logic of action even 
though the tight couplings demand rule-based logic of action. This is a situation where the 
subunits are “confronted” with each other and forced to take action based on the 
assumption that the behavior of others is consistent with established procedures. 
Organizational actors are now in a situation where they need to trust their own task-based 
logic of action, but at the same time have to believe that others are following procedure. 
This invites the potential for higher risk.  
Eventually the organization shifts back to the ‘Design’ stage where it seeks to restore the 
organization by implementing better control systems. This is more or less a time for 
redesigning in which organizations act on lessons learned from previous mistakes and 
reintroduce a top-down management structure.  
So, how can we use the analytical framework (see Figure 1), which includes practical drift, 
organizational factors, and the regulatory regimes, in comparing and analyzing the 
accidents/incident? By using the framework, we can identify how the management 
structures shifted from a top-down to a flat and task-based logic of action. As the model 
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implies, we will see whether communication and compliance deteriorate when shifting to a 
practical drift mode. How do the subunits in an organization affect the management and 
regulatory regimes, and vice versa, especially considering compliance with rules and 
procedures? In what way is the workers’ competence affected by the shift and how does 
their competence affect how well they execute both rule-based and task-based logics of 
action?  
To use this analytical framework most effectively, the regulatory regimes and the different 
organizational factors must be conceptualized.  
 
2.2 Regulatory regimes 
 
Regulatory regimes are an important contextual frame in this thesis. According to the 
analytical framework, the regulatory regime is at the very top of the hierarchy and will affect 
the organization, organizational factors, practical drift, and ultimately the production and 
safety outcome. A regulatory regime can be defined as the “regulation of risk, defined as 
governmental interference with market or social process to control potential adverse 
consequences to health“(Hood et al., 2001:3). Regarding this, Leveson’s theory (2004) makes 
an interesting contribution. Leveson is a structuralist who sees the hierarchy in a 
sociotechnical system as an opportunity (rather than an obstacle) for organizations to act 
safely, where the level above sets boundaries for the next level. This notion can also be 
applied to the analysis model, especially in the design stage, which is characterized by the 
top-down structure. She also focused on the importance of feedback loops in a system. 
Whether the boundaries set by the levels above reach their full potential depends on 
feedback about how the system acts upon these boundaries (how boundaries comply with 
rules and regulations). In other words, there needs to be equilibrium between those who set 
boundaries and those who are restricted.  This includes communication and indicates the 
need for a good communication system, which also is included in the analysis model for 
reasons of compliance and operational safety.  
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Hood claimed that “there is a substantial variety in the way risks and hazards are handled by 
the state” (Hood et al., 2001:5); different views on risk and hazards lay the foundation for 
different regulations. Hood illustrated with the example of the 1996 campsite tragedy in 
Spain where even neighboring states like France, Germany, and Ireland had different views 
on hazards and therefore different approaches to how they regulated risk. These different 
views on risk and hazards and the associated tradition in regulation ultimately affected how 
the actors in question reacted and behaved, which varied depending on their differing 
expectations of the regulatory regime involved. For this thesis, it is important to remember 
that how different states views risk and hazards have an effect on any differences in their 
regulatory regimes. This theory also shows the contours of how complex the regulation 
relationship between states and organizations can be.  
Furthermore, Hood (2001) described different aspects of regimes, for example, how cost-
benefit might affect how we regulate road safety. How many resources are we willing to use 
with the intent to improve safety? The Norwegian government has a zero vision for 
Norwegian roads, which means a goal of no fatalities; however, more than 200 lives are lost 
to road accidents each year. A natural question is, therefore, whether we use the resources 
we have available to prevent these accidents. Are the regulation strategies in step with the 
vision or is the vision too expensive for the regime? 
The perspective of decision making and conflict of interest (Rosness et al., 2002) provides an 
interesting view into how cost-benefit analysis may affect how we regulate safety. This 
perspective takes into consideration the complexity within organizations regarding what 
should be their priority. For example, it is easier for management to prioritize short-term 
gains rather than investing in safety, which is more of a long-term gain. However, the 
workers in the sharp end are often blamed if something goes wrong and are also the ones to 
get hurt if the safety barriers are not intact. In other words, the sharp end (the workers), 
want safety prioritized while management prioritizes short-term gains like economic growth 
and efficiency; this demonstrates a clear conflict of interest. Also, this perspective shows a 
conflict of interest where there is complex interaction between different boundaries―for 
example, those set by the state and management concerning safety, financial boundaries, 
and each worker’s individual boundary when it comes to acceptable workload. This 
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perspective is demonstrated in a model developed by Rasmussen and can be used to 
understand how organizations react to different requirements set by the regulatory regime 
and how organizations themselves set their boundaries (e.g., rules, procedures, practices) on 
the basis of how the state sets its boundaries (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Migration Model (Rosness et al., 2002:46). 
When it comes to regimes, Hood described them as “the complex of institutional geography, 
rules, practice and animating ideas that are associated with the regulation of a particular risk 
or hazard” (Hood et al., 2001:9). Hood expressed interest in how to analyze different 
regimes and therefore described three basic features of regulatory regimes:  
1. Regulatory regimes as systems, where they are viewed as interacting or related parts 
and the relationship between the different regulators (e.g., the relationship between 
the levels in Rasmussen’s model) can be analyzed 
2. Regulatory regimes as entities 
3. Regulatory regimes as bounded systems that specify different levels and breadth 
“Regulators are uniquely placed to function as one of the most effective defences against 
organizational accidents” (Reason, 1997:182). 
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“The regulatory process – discovery, monitoring, investigation and sanction – is inevitably 
constrained by the interorganizational relations existing between the regulatory body and 
the regulated company. These, in turn, lead to relationships based more upon bargaining 
and compromise than threats and sanctions. The fact that both the regulator and the 
regulated are autonomous, existing as separate and independent entities, poses special 
problems for the regulator” (Reason, 1997:173). 
 
2.3 Organizational factors 
 
The organizational factors are essential in the analytical framework (see Figure 1) because 
one can see the interaction of the different factors, the regulatory regime, and Snook’s 
practical drift. Before the various factors are presented, the meaning of organizational factor 
must be clarified. There is also a need to clarify the difference between underlying factors 
and immediate causes of accidents.  Accident investigations often find that something 
technical failed or that someone in the sharp end (worker end) made a mistake that caused 
the accident, called the immediate cause. However, in this thesis, the focus is to look beyond 
the immediate cause and see if certain characteristics in the organization have developed 
over time and were triggered by that one technical failure or that one mistake by personnel 
in the sharp end.  As Reason put it, “unsafe acts are merely symptoms of the underlying 
organizational and managerial pathology” (Reason, 1997:186).  Underlying factors form a 
chain of different components that interact and lead to potentially higher risk. This is what 
Turner (1997) called the incubation process – a process where accidents develop over time. 
“This is a development process where chains of discrepant events develop over time and 
accumulate unnoticed…This is a result of a culture where information and interpretations of 
hazard signals fail” (Rosness et al., 2002:37).  
The terms underlying factors and organizational factors are often used interchangeably, but 
there is an important difference between them. Technical, organizational, and human 
factors can be underlying causes of an accident. This study’s focus is on the organizational 
factors that have developed over time and therefore can be considered underlying 
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organizational factors that caused the accidents/incident. To make it clearer, “organizational 
factors include organizational structure, management, corporate culture, training and 
recruitment” (Westrum, 2009:5-1). As one can see, organizational factors are essential 
elements in constituting an organization. The five organizational factors studied here are, as 
mentioned, management, communication, competence, procedures, and compliance. Each 
will be accounted for and theoretically described before being discussed more thoroughly in 
light of the study’s findings in Chapter 4. 
 
2.3.1 Management 
In accordance with the analytical framework, management sets the terms for the 
organization and will influence how the organization drifts from stage to stage, how the 
communication, procedures, and competence systems work, and how the organization 
complies with both regulatory and its own procedures and standards. In addition, 
management’s relationship with the regulatory regime will also have an effect on whether 
the organization drifts to a higher risk stage or not.  
Management, as an essential part of every organization, will always be responsible for 
occurrences within the organization. Champoux (2000) used Henri Fayol’s description when 
defining five functions of management: planning, organizing, command, coordination, and 
control. Even though he described these functions long ago, they are just as applicable as a 
definition of what management contains. At least, this is what management should contain 
(Champoux, 2000). The focus in this thesis is safety management and how the organization’s 
management structure can give the organization the opportunity to act safely in all 
operations. Safety management is defined as “all measures taken to achieve, maintain, and 
develop a level of security/safety in accordance with defined objectives” (Aven et al., 
2008:67). Safety management is a continuous activity that occurs in tandem with and is 
integrated into all planning and work (Aven et al., 2008). One must try to achieve the best 
possible instruments, solutions, and measures that are adapted to the framework and that 
consider safety, economy, and other relevant areas.  
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As the analytical framework shows, management is an important key to all of the other 
organizational factors, because the management system must ensure compliance with 
regulatory and internal requirements, adequate communication systems, the right 
competencies, and a good organizational system for procedures. Management strategies for 
handling these challenges will depend on which stage in practical drift the organization has 
entered. Different management strategies might also affect which stage in the PD model the 
organization is in. The PD model seeks to capture both the contextual and the temporal 
factors in explaining how accidents and incidents occur. This, of course, will affect 
management strategies and how they are executed.  
 
2.3.2 Communication 
According to the analytical framework, communication is an important link among 
management, operations, and production and safety outcomes. To study communication 
properly, it is important to look at the communication both upward and downward, even 
horizontally, between different organizations and different subunits. How will 
communication ultimately affect and be affected by the drifting toward an unsafe situation 
and potential accident? 
Communication is one of organizational factors studied in this research.  “Organizational 
communication includes purpose, flow, and direction of messages and the media used for 
those messages. Such communication happens within the complex, interdependent social 
systems of organizations” (Champoux, 2000:242). Communication is included in the analysis 
model as a link between management and outcome, which includes most processes in 
between. To include the PD part of the model, how and whether to communicate may vary 
depending on which stage the organization has entered.  
“Organizational communication happens over a pathway called a network. The network can 
be formal as defined by formal organizational positions and relationships among those 
positions. It can also be informal as defined by informal patterns of social interaction and the 
informal groups. Communication over the networks goes in any direction: Downward, 
upward, or horizontally” (Champoux, 2000:243). 
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“The functions of organizational communication include information sharing, feedback, 
integration, persuasion, emotion and innovation. The feedback function of organizational 
communication lets people know about the quality of their job performance. Feedback can 
reduce uncertainty, give people important cues about levels of performance, and act as a 
motivational resource” (Champoux, 2000:247). 
In 1978, Turner introduced a new way of thinking about how disasters occur in his 
publication “Man-made Disasters.” To understand how a disaster occurs, one must 
understand that somewhere in the chain of events leading to the accident there will be 
absence of knowledge and communication (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).  
Problems related to communication and information are common in all organizations, 
Turner claimed.  Therefore, it would be wrong to say that all such cases lead to disasters 
(Turner & Pidgeon, 1997:50). However, as Turner found in his research, difficulties with 
communication has always been a part of the problem.   
Turner also pointed out difficulties with involving multiple organizations in a complex work 
task. When dealing with a potential hazard, procedures are being carried out by individuals 
and there is a need to know that these individuals can cope with potential hazards. “This 
should be relatively easy when dealing with a small, clearly defined group, and especially 
when they are employees of one organization, the problem of giving them adequate 
information is relatively simple” (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997:55). 
Even though Turner studied different accidents than those studied here, many of the aspects 
that he drew upon apply to this thesis.  
2.3.3 Competence 
Within the framework used in this thesis, competence is an important aspect of the practical 
drift part of the model. How and why people perform their work task in a certain way is the 
essence of this model, specifically, the tendency to cut more or less loose from the decided 
way of doing things, thereby moving toward high-risk stages where the probability for 
accidents to occur increases.  
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Nordhaug defined competence as “applied and applicable knowledge, abilities, and skills” 
(Nordhaug, 2007:36). Nordhaug continued by addressing the importance of competence; 
having the right competence might be a determinant of who survives and who does not in 
market competition. A continued focus on developing staff competence is therefore 
essential.  Within the concept of competence also lies the tacit knowledge of the different 
subunits. When shifting from a rule-based to a task-based logic of action, the requirements 
of competence might also shift, affecting at least how one uses organizational competence, 
including both tacit and explicit knowledge. As Turner stated, “[m]uch scientific and 
engineered knowledge is of this tacit, craft nature, being absorbed and transmitted in the 
course of procedures of craft training” (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997:18).  This will affect how one 
shifts from one stage to the next in the PD model, and how well one shifts from rule-based 
to task-based logic of action – and then back again. In transmission of competence and 
knowledge, personal contact and interaction is the way to go, according to Turner (1997). 
How does the organization ensure that new personnel receive this transmission of 
knowledge? 
What’s important for this thesis though is how management structure, procedures, 
communication, and similar aspects ensure the right competence in the right place. How 
does the system handle competence and ensure the right competence at all times? 
 
2.3.4 Compliance  
The analytical model also contains a compliance factor, namely, how the organization and its 
subunits comply with procedures, standards, and regulations. The compliance part depends 
on how management designs and communicates current regulations. In addition, it depends 
on what kind of competence the organization has and how the different subunits are 
established.  
Compliance is here understood as the involved parties’ ability to act in accordance with 
applicable procedures, standards, and/or regulations. How the organization complies with 
regulatory requirements and its own procedures and plans, decided by management, is 
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essential in the analytical framework. Whether or not the organization is in compliance with 
legislation and procedures necessarily affect the drifting from one stage to the next in the 
movement toward unsafe acts. A core element of the practical drift theory is that during the 
drift away from the planned way of doing things, a failure to comply with procedures will 
eventually lead to failure.  
This could also be expressed as the extent to which there is consistency between behavioral 
patterns in the sharp end (worker end) and intended decision structures in the blunt end 
(management end) of the organization. Tinmannsvik (2008) introduced the term silent 
deviation. She made a distinction between deviation and “silent” deviation; silent deviation 
involves developing a work practice that deviates more or less from the planned way to do a 
job (i.e., as described in the procedure).   According to Tinmannsvik (2008), silent deviation 
may result in a lower safety level than intended or designed into the system. Behavior is 
influenced by the structure, that is, the way work is planned and intended to operate 
(normative). Structure is the formal framework, including plans, procedures, defined 
responsibilities, reporting, formal channels of communication, risk assessment, and 
deviation.  
2.3.5 Procedures 
The procedures in the analytical framework are incorporated in practical drift, where when 
employees are behaving according to a rule-based logic of action, they are following 
procedures set by management or others. In the ISO 9000 standard, a procedure is defined 
as a “specified way to carry out an activity or a process” (ISO 9000, 2008:3.4.5). Procedures 
are tools to be used to get to a desired point within a certain framework. Procedures are 
intended to help the organization, its subunits, and members stay on the organizational 
pathway. Procedures are also intended to ensure compliance with legislation and 
requirements imposed by regulators or the government. An interesting aspect of this is that 
the relationships in the hierarchic system affect both how procedures are set and/or how 
they are met within the organization.  
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To what degree employees should and actually are behaving in accordance with procedures 
and how the procedures themselves affect the organizations or different subunit’s drift will 
be an interesting contribution to the analysis.  
 
2.4 From theory to analysis  
 
The analytical framework combines the various theoretical contributions so that the 
research questions can be analyzed in a more interesting way. The goal is to see how the 
various organizational factors influenced the formation of two specific accidents and one 
incident and how the various factors interacted. Particularly important is the examination of 
how organizational factors affect the organization’s movement from one stage to another in 
practical drift through the use of different logics of action in different stages and how 
different parts of the organization tend to break away on the pathway to higher risk and 
possibility of accident. 
In addition, the framework also addresses how the regulatory regimes constitute an 
important contextual frame for organizations handling safety and risk, which ultimately 
affects their safety and production outcome.  
Finally, it is important to remember that context and degree of complexity and couplings 
shift during the lifespan of an organization, both in the analysis in this thesis and in real life.  
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3.0 Methodology 
 
The goal of this chapter is to highlight the steps that were taken to answer the research 
questions and why these steps constitute a suitable process in this thesis. 
The aim of the thesis is to analyze and compare two accidents and one incident, based on 
already collected data and written reports, to bring additional knowledge to this research 
area. 
3.1 Choosing the cases 
 
In this study, the three cases were selected on the following basis: They had recently taken 
place, they were in the same industry, and there was extensive information available about 
them. Even though the cases might be considered to be of the same type― offshore drilling 
accidents―they differed from each other in their severity and in their global placement in 
three different regions. Still, what made them interesting to study, despite their differences, 
is the hypothesis that strong organizational commonalities exist among them that might be 
transferable to other accidents and other regions.  
3.2 Choosing data 
 
The analysis in this thesis was based on data collected by others, specifically, extensive 
research and investigation by scientists and other investigators in the aftermaths of the 
accidents/incident. The choice to use the written investigation reports and research as the 
main data sources was a conscious choice with regard to the extensive information already 
collected on the three cases.  
Qualitative methods are characterized by the fact that you study in depth, but study 
relatively few units. This study sought commonalities and differences between only three 
accidents/incident.  This is a document analysis, since the data collecting was not done 
through interviews, but rather through analysis of information collected by others, written 
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down in different documents. A document analysis can be both quantitative and qualitative. 
According to Blaikie (2010:207), “textual material can be treated quantitatively by being 
coded into categories that are assigned numbers, counted and manipulated statistically. 
Alternatively, they can be treated qualitatively as identifying phenomena among which 
connections are established.” The reason for choosing a qualitative document analysis was 
the research question and this thesis aim. The statistical gathering of information from 
inquiry reports would not have given the answers required here. Table 1 is a schematic 
presentation of the reports used in this thesis. 
Main Reports Secondary Reports Others 
Deep Water. The Gulf Oil 
Disaster and the Future of 
Offshore Drilling – 
National Commission, 
2011. 
Deep Water Horizon 
Accident Investigation 
Report – BP, 2010. 
Causes, Learning Points and 
Improvements for the 
Norwegian Shelf – SINTEF, 
2011. 
   
Report of the Montara 
Commission of Inquiry – 
Montara Commission, 
2010.   
Macondo Well Deepwater 
Horizon Blowout: Lessons for 
Improving Offshore Drilling 
Safety – National Academy, 
2012. 
Learning from Incidents in 
Statoil – IRIS, 2011. 
(Læring av hendelser I 
Statoil. En studie av 
bakenforliggende årsaker 
til hendelsen på Gullfaks C 
og Statoils læreevne – IRIS, 
2011). 
Audit Report: Supervision 
with Statoil’s Planning of 
Well 34/10-C-06A – PSA, 
2010. (Tilsynsaktivitet med 
Statoils planlegging av brønn 
34/10-C-06A. – PTIL, 2010). 
Risk Management in the Oil 
and Gas Industry: Integration 
of Human, Organizational and 
Technical Factors – 
Skogdalen, J. E. , 2011. 
    
 
    
Dypt Vann i Horisonten. 
Regulering av sikkerhet i 
Norge og USA i lys av 
Deepwater Horizon – 
ulykken. Ryggvik, H., 2012. 
 
  
 Table 1. Schematic Overview of Relevant Reports. 
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The categorization of the reports was based on which reports were used the most in this 
thesis. The reports listed as main reports and secondary reports received the most analysis. 
The other reports acted as important supplements to the main and secondary reports. The 
collection of data in the various main and secondary reports will be briefly accounted for 
here. 
The National Commission (2011) investigating the Macondo blowout intended to focus on 
aspects that would lead to a practical recommendation, with an even further goal of 
transforming America into a leader in safe and effective offshore drilling operations. The 
commission investigated on the orders of President Barack Obama and was composed of 
seven members appointed by the president. The order was one among others to examine 
facts and circumstances concerning Macondo’s root causes, improvements to laws and 
regulations, and industry practices. This was to form a public report and the commission was 
to have full access to information and to hold public hearings.   
The inquiry report contained both the orders and the mandate for the investigation. It also 
included the names of commission members, their meeting frequency, lists of their working 
papers, and a list of commission staff and consultants. What was missing in this inquiry was a 
description of the procedures used throughout the investigation. How did the commission 
investigate? Who was interviewed? What were the pros and cons of the investigation 
methods?  
BP’s own investigation report (2010) about the Deepwater Horizon accident was also used to 
supplement the inquiry report. This internal investigation report had a much more technical 
focus, but was still relevant to this study since one can clearly see that organizational failures 
underlay the more technical errors. Also, it is interesting to observe how the different 
reports were written and designed. Even though BP’s report was professional, it was clear 
that the focus was on its own organization and the organizations involved, such as 
Halliburton. The accident led to several court cases, where guilt obviously was an important 
factor. This must also be taken into consideration when reading BP’s report. Therefore, the 
BP report was used as a supplement to the more independent National Commission’s report 
(2011).  
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The Montara Commission of Inquiry (2010) was to investigate and identify the circumstances 
and the likely cause(s) of the accident and to review the adequacy, effectiveness, and 
performance of the regulatory regime. It was also to make recommendations to the Minister 
for Resources and Energy, other relevant Ministers, regulators, and the industry. This inquiry 
was conducted mainly by document analyses, which are all public at the commission’s Web 
site. Also, drafts of the report were made available at a public hearing for comments before 
the report was finalized.  
The Gullfaks C incident was studied by IRIS in 2011. “Learning from Incidents in Statoil” is a 
study of underlying factors and causes of the Gullfaks C accident and of Statoil’s learning 
ability. This study was conducted after Statoil received an order from the PSA following the 
Gullfaks C incident to implement studies designed to achieve safety improvements. Statoil 
therefore ordered an independent study of the accident and Statoil’s learning ability; the 
study was conducted by IRIS. Eleven different researchers with broad knowledge and 
backgrounds were involved in the process, and data collection was mainly performed 
through interviews of employees at all levels of Statoil and its supply companies. In addition, 
the PSA’s own audit report (2010) was used in this study. 
 
3.3 Data reduction 
 
As mentioned earlier, a lot of information has been written about the accidents/incident, a 
large part of which has been used in this study. Answering the research questions developed 
in this thesis required significant data reduction of the large amounts of information. When 
reducing and categorizing the data, both the analytical framework (see Figure 1) and the 
chosen theories were necessary tools.  
The analytical framework used in this thesis was developed by IRIS and was also used as an 
analysis tool in the IRIS report (2011). In this thesis, however, the analysis model was 
intended to structure the thesis so as to better compare the three different cases and to 
include all the organizational factors and the hierarchic system of which the organization is a 
part.  
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While reducing the data from the written documents and deciding what to use in this thesis, 
some difficulties arose. One was that the different reports were in fact different. They were 
written by different groups of people that to some degree focused on different aspects of 
the accidents. This made some of the data collecting and reduction easy and some more 
challenging. In addition, some issues were not addressed explicitly, and some were. Still, by 
knowing what data to look for and using the analysis model, the collection and reduction of 
data were still possible.  
 
Categorization was mainly based on the various organizational factors. 
3.4 Analysis 
 
This study was a comparative case study. A case study is defined by the fact that several 
cases are used to answer the same research question and the cases are selected based on 
what one wishes to explore (Jacobsen, 2005:85). This research’s empirical data were based 
on a variety of reports created in conjunction with the three accidents studied. The three 
accidents have been thoroughly analyzed and described in different inquiry reports and one 
research project.  
Like this thesis, the reports were written to learn from each accident so as to increase 
organizational knowledge with the objective of avoiding accidents in the future. Even though 
the reports were written with an aim to learn from the accidents, this thesis concentrated on 
the organizational aspects. Through finding commonalities and analyzing them closely, the 
goal was to provide a deeper understanding of how underlying organizational factors are 
important elements in the occurrence of offshore drilling accidents.   
When analyzing documents, one must be careful in choosing what kind of reports to include. 
The reports chosen here were considered to be both serious and thorough, especially in 
their own collection of data, analysis, and scope.  
To help improve the structure of this thesis, the analytical framework was used; this made it 
easier to categorize the data and improve the analysis. The categorization began in the 
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reading process with coding the different organizational aspects in the reports. This was 
done to make comparison easier and to pull out the most important aspects of the 
organizational factors. Then, the analytical framework was used to examine the bigger 
picture, how the different factors related to each other, and how the discussion involving the 
different regulatory regimes fit in.  
The steps taken in the analysis were also inspired by the hermeneutic circle, where one goes 
from analyzing parts of the data, to seeing the different parts in relation to each other, to 
seeing the big picture with the help of each part. These steps should provide a deeper 
understanding of how each accident, each organizational aspect, and each regional regime is 
understood―alone and in relation to each other; this facilitates the ability to draw 
conclusions about how the industry can learn from these three accidents so that the 
possibility for recurrence decreases. When writing an academic thesis like this, it is also 
important to use relevant theory, which can improve the analysis and discussion more than 
the researcher’s own thoughts on the data. The reason for choosing the theories used in this 
thesis was to provide the capability to analyze the data through a relevant set of academic 
contributions to the field. The theory, as an important tool in the analysis, is presented in the 
theory chapter. A conceptual clarification is also needed so that concepts which are 
important for this thesis can be understood in the same way as intended.  
 
3.5 The quality of evidence 
 
A main challenge with this method is to keep in mind that the data used have been collected 
by others.  Reinterpreting what has already been interpreted by those writing the reports is 
a challenge. It is important to clarify what kind of institution or people have written the 
reports, who they were written for, who ordered them, what kind of context they were 
written in, the time limits in the inquiries/studies,  and similar items.   
Scott (1990:6) set four criteria for judging the quality of evidence:  
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(a) Authenticity – Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin?  
(b) Credibility – Is the evidence free from error and distortion?  
(c) Representativeness – Is the evidence typical of its kind?   
(d) Meaning – Is the evidence clear and comprehensible?  
Based on the reports analyzed in this thesis, there are no reasons to believe that these 
documents used as evidence cannot be trusted. Their authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness, and meaning seem to be of high quality. These are objective documents, 
mostly written by independent institutions and researchers. Multiple people were involved 
in each of the reports and some were even sent out for public hearing before being finalized. 
Of course, as Scott stated, “[f]acts are not raw perceptions, but are theoretically constructed 
observations” (Scott, 1990:54). This means that every piece of knowledge drawn from the 
different reports is affected by the different authors’ theoretical perspectives.   
According to Scott, official documents such as these inquiry reports, are shaped by the 
structure and activities of the state, both directly and indirectly (Scott, 1999:59). This is 
clearly visible in the various reports, where each country’s culture is reflected in its focus and 
in the way the reports are written. However, the reports still are objective and clearly state 
wrongs and rights in the context of each accident/incident.  
These reports provided extensive information for use in this analysis. There was no need for 
additional interviews because those who would be interesting to interview already had 
answered major questions for these and other investigations. In addition, this was not 
considered necessary to address the research question. The main focus was to compare the 
three accidents in a search to find common underlying organizational factors and to 
determine whether the different regulatory regimes could have affected the occurrence of 
the accidents/incident.  
Deciding whether or not the results from this thesis can be generalized is not 
straightforward. However, the fact that coincidence distinguished the outcome of these 
three accidents the transferability to other accidents is relevant. In other words, the 
underlying organizational factors highlighted in this paper may also apply to other 
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organizations and events. Especially for similar major accidents and the potential for major 
accidents to develop, common factors highlighted in this thesis might also represent 
challenges. All organizations have elements of these underlying organizational factors and 
these factors must be systematically taken into account in all organizations. Although the 
degree of influence the various factors have in each organization might vary, critical points 
are emphasized in this thesis and should be taken into account in other organizations. 
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4.0 Results 
 
This chapter presents the findings of this research and discusses the commonalities across 
the accidents within each organizational factor. Although each factor is presented 
separately, the factors overlap in certain fields. This shows the complexity involved in how 
the underlying organizational factors affect each other.  
The analytical framework is illustrated in both the theory and method chapters and in Figure 
1.  
 
Figure 1. Governance Structure and PD Model (IRIS, 2011:16). 
 
4.1 Management 
 
When analyzing management, the focus was on the management structure, on the way the 
management and its structure affected the practical drift, and on how management was 
33 
 
affected by the relationship with the organization’s regulator. The main discussion in this 
part will focus on the ways in which management both consciously and unconsciously 
affected how the organization and its subunits moved into stages in which the subunits were 
more or less decoupled from what was intended. It is this decoupling that may end up in the 
failure in which the accidents occurred (Snook, 2000).  
The PSA inquiry after the Gullfaks C incident stated that “management at all levels 
inadequately ensured that the planning of the operation was carried out in accordance with 
the company’s requirements, Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) policy and strategy” 
(PSA, 2010:3). An MPD operation like that at well C06 demands thorough planning that is 
reckoned to take at least six months. As the IRIS report stated, for some reason this process 
was cut to three months, which might have been a critical mistake. This indicated a need to 
save both time and money, but that safety was compromised. There “was a sense of 
urgency, and that decisions on technical issues and progress in drilling activities undertaken 
without the input and concerns of professionals were handled in a satisfactory manner” 
(IRIS, 2011:33).  
The National Commission was quite direct in its statement that “[t]he most significant failure 
at the Macondo – and the clear root cause of the blowout – was a failure of industry 
management” (National Commission, 2011:122). The decision-making process at Macondo 
did not adequately ensure that personnel fully considered the risk created by time- and 
money-saving decisions. Some of the decisions made clearly saved time and money for the 
companies’ involved. For example, neither Halliburton’s nor BP’s “management process 
ensured that cement was adequately tested. Halliburton had insufficient controls in place to 
make sure laboratory testing was performed in a timely manner or that test results were 
vetted rigorously in-house or with the clients. It appears that Halliburton did not even have 
testing results in its possession showing that the Macondo slurry was stable until after the 
job had been pumped. It is difficult to imagine a clearer failure of management or 
communication, the commission stated” (National Commission, 2011:123). BP’s 
management process did not adequately identify or address risks created by late changes to 
well design and procedures. BP did “not ensure that key decisions in the months leading up 
to the blowout were safe or sound from an engineering perspective.” 
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A PTTEPAA failure in management was also a major issue. “The management structure paid 
insufficient attention to putting in place mechanisms to asses and manage project risks, the 
competence of key personnel, the adequacy of Well Operations Management Plan, the 
WOMP, and the interaction with contractors” (Montara Commission, 2010:10). This in turn 
resulted in several poor decisions and judgments by both PTTEPAA’s senior personnel on the 
rig and onshore personnel.  
4.1.1 Inadequate planning, a pathway to failure 
In all of the three cases, clearly, the top-down management structure was not adequate, not 
even in the design stage when one would think it important. In the stages of planning, risk 
assessment, and building strategies for interaction, there is a need for managers to put their 
effort into developing procedures and routines to build a robust and resilient organization. 
As the inquiry report after the Montara accident stated, this turned into mistakes made by 
personnel in the sharp (worker) end. Based on stage 4 in the PD model (failure), this is what 
can happen when a situation arises that demands adequate procedures for handling all 
possible scenarios and personnel who comply with these procedures.  Accidents occur in this 
stage when personnel follow their own task-based logic of action instead of the rule-based 
logic that is required to address complexity or tightness of couplings.  
If one goes backward stage by stage, one can see that for personnel to act in accordance 
with procedures management already in the planning stage must have a clear strategy and 
spell out clear procedures. Management needs to be consistent for the procedures to reach 
their full potential. In fact, if procedures are not followed and the organization shifts to a 
more task-based logic of action with tight couplings in the drifting toward stage 4, then 
management needs a system to detect what is happening in the organization. If one could 
recognize when different subunits shift from rule-based to task-based logics of action, one 
might develop a more proactive strategy for change. A key factor here would be adequate 
communication systems, which are discussed later.  
By communicating proactively, management could change the procedures before an 
incident/accident happens instead of after – from the failed stage to the design stage. As 
Snook (2000) stated, a task-based logic of action is sometimes the “right way” to do the job, 
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depending on both the context and the temporal factors. Also, as Tinmannsvik (2008) would 
say, the reason we use people instead of machines is that in some situations there is a need 
to be adaptable and to do something outside the procedure to perform the best and safest 
job. However, it is important to understand the consequences of actions that are not 
consistent with procedures. According to Tinmannsvik (2008), the local adjustments in 
relation to the planned procedures for performing the job (informal deviations) can cause 
unexpected interactions that have serious consequences. Good management is not always 
sufficient to achieve a high level of safety in day-to-day life. It does not matter how good the 
systems look on paper if the people in the organization do not have a culture of thinking and 
acting in accordance with work practices. One way to improve or develop procedures and 
job descriptions are to make the silent deviations visible (i.e., encourage and facilitate a 
discussion about alternative ways to do the job). A prerequisite for this is a working 
environment that encourages openness and learning. Making sure that the organization has 
the systems for developing adequate procedures and a culture of reporting, openness, and 
learning is management’s responsibility. That said, even if management itself does not catch 
the drifting within the organization or operation, the management systems and procedures 
need to be designed in a way that detects this drifting.  
In terms of the management system, managers seem to “hide behind” the system. 
Statements from the IRIS report indicated that “management documentation is to be 
followed regardless” and that at higher levels of management leaders seem to think that all 
employees comply with management systems, procedures, and documentation (IRIS, 
2011:91). This just exemplifies the need for members of management to become more 
aware of how their organization actually works, and that there always will be some deviation 
from the procedures, depending on the context. Poor management leads to poor judgment 
and decision making in the sharp (worker) end. In the three accidents/incident, management 
consistently failed to ensure that adequate procedures, plans, and risk assessments existed 
for different types of situations.  
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4.1.2 Time is money – but what about safety? 
The dilemma of time versus money and how this affects safety is another commonality in 
the three cases. By using the terms of the analytical framework, one will hit the failure stage 
when personnel feel that they must take shortcuts and do things differently and quicker to 
achieve the company’s goals. This is not necessarily a conscious choice by management, but 
this is the way that subunits perceive it.  
This is a competitive and exposed industry, where management must make tough decisions 
within limited time. In accordance with Rasmussens model (see Figure 3), pressure comes 
from internal goals, but also from the competition of other organizations, the number of 
requirements, regulations, and similar outside forces. The analytical framework exemplifies 
how both the regulatory regime and the market affect safety management and the practical 
drift within the organization. As mentioned, this might not be a conscious choice to push 
subunits toward failure, but rather the opposite. The fact that this might be an unconscious 
consequence of management actions makes this discussion even more important. There is 
an obvious need to increase awareness of how different contextual frames affect the logic of 
action in organizations. When subunits feel that they are forced to prioritize job elements to 
get the job done quickly, rather than safely, they take shortcuts. This is when the subunits 
are more or less forced to detach themselves from rule-based logic of action.  
In the offshore drilling industry, time is money. The quicker one completes planning, risk 
assessing, and other items, the earlier one can start production and cash flow. As the 
National Commission (2011) report stated, project profitability depends on how soon 
production can yield income. Delays in one part cause delays in other parts; one is therefore 
often put in situations where getting the job done quickly compromises safety. Furthermore, 
delays in production of just a couple of hours, not to mention days, can result in a significant 
loss of profit. “The decision-making process at Macondo did not adequately ensure that 
personnel fully considered the risks created by time- and money-saving decision[s]… many of 
the decisions that BP, Halliburton and Transocean made that increased the risk of the 
Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money)” (National 
Commission, 2011:125). After the Montara accident, the inquiry stated that “[t]he prevailing 
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philosophy revealed by the PTTEPA’s action appears to have been to get the job done 
without delay” (Montara Commission, 20110:11). The fact that management failed to 
recognize risk, did not assess risk properly when it was recognized, and pushed forward to 
get the job done without evaluating the consequences reflected poor decision making. 
4.1.3 Planning for the long term  
To prevent accidents, one needs a long-term approach to safe operations; this can be 
achieved by taking the time needed to plan in the most adequate way. The planning stage in 
the model clearly states the importance of management in this period of time. This is where 
the foundation of the whole production process is laid and essential safety-critical decisions 
are taken. This is where one chooses a pathway and what type of systems to use and 
determines the distribution of responsibility for internal and cooperating organizations. As a 
highly reliable organization, HRO-theorists emphasize, among other things, the 
organization’s ability to predict errors it might make and failures it might experience. In the 
design stage, it is management’s responsibility to first ensure this ability and then to ensure 
that the right procedures are established so that potential failure can be managed if and 
when it arrives. The danger of moving away from a rule-based logic of action to a task-based 
logic of action involves subunits not acting in accordance with procedures when failure 
arises, but rather acting in accordance with their own developed task-based logic of action. 
As hard as it can be, the need for management to be continuously updated on where the 
organization is in the stages of the PD model is important so that management can step in 
on short notice if the organization drifts from stage 3 to stage 4. As discussed earlier, one 
needs a system to detect and implement changes in a safe manner. These two accidents and 
the one incident demonstrated that when changes occurred, management systems failed to 
adequately address them.  
4.1.4 The possibilities within the hierarchy    
The analytical framework contains a hierarchic system, with regulatory regimes on top 
(macro level), safety management in the middle (meso level), and then the process within 
the organizations and the outcomes (micro level). It seems that there is strict respect for the 
hierarchy when it comes to who the “boss” is. At Gullfaks C, the suppliers stated that they 
did as their told by Statoil, end of discussion. At Montara, the impression of the operators’ 
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authority was the same; “it was clearly PTTEPAA that effectively called the shots” (Montara 
Commission, 2010:10). As can be seen from the discussion concerning the interface between 
BP and its suppliers at Macondo, the respect for the operator seems to be as valid here. 
However, the IRIS report (2011) still indicated difficulties related to the interface between 
the operator and suppliers. Statoil is the largest oil company in Norway and many supply 
companies depend on contracts with Statoil to survive in the market. The report showed 
that Statoil was very much aware of this and used its size to get its way if there were 
disagreements about the contract, planning, or operational process. In relation to the 
analysis model, this involves multiple stages. An aggressive and uncompromising contractor 
does not provide a sound foundation for cooperation and communication. In addition, the 
fact that the different organizations used different management documentation systems 
hampered the sharing of information and knowledge even more. In fact, as one of the 
differences between the U.S. and Norwegian system is that there were no requirements to 
have a documented management system in the U.S. (Ryggvik, 2012). 
Leveson (2004) emphasized the possibilities that lie within the hierarchic system, where the 
level above sets the boundaries for the next level so as to operate safely. In accordance with 
this theory and the examples drawn from the different inquiry reports, the organizations 
have a great opportunity to make good use of the authoritarian respect the contractors have 
for the operator. When this hierarchic system is already in place, it is easier for management 
to perform its leadership role, which could make the design part of the operation more 
manageable. However, one must not overlook management responsibilities during the other 
stages, as discussed earlier. The important point still lies in the objective to agree when it 
comes to the type of logic of action that is needed and used in the specific situation.  
4.1.5 The regulatory influence 
Regulatory regimes affect how organizations manage risk and safety. The discussion of this 
impact largely concerns how the relationship between the regulator and the organization 
strengthens or weakens the way one moves toward the failure stage. Is there a perfect way 
to regulate an organization’s efforts to prevent accidents?  
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Since the three accidents studied occurred in different parts of the world (the US, Australia, 
and Norway), different types of regulatory regimes were involved.  The way the different 
regulatory regimes were organized and structured affected both the degree of influence 
they had on the different organizations and the relationship between the organizations and 
the regulators.  
While the Norwegian and Australian industries are required to take a proactive attitude 
toward safety, it seems that the US industry is more or less “sitting on the fence,” waiting for 
authorities to identify failures and implement solutions.  One example of this is how risk 
assessment, which is a proactive instrument, was not a requirement to the industry in the US 
(Ryggvik, 2012).   
While the Norwegian system involves the government, the employers, and the employees, 
the so-called three-party cooperation, the Australian system expects the operator and 
employers to take most of the responsibility. However, platform inspections are conducted 
once a year by the regulator. The US, in contrast, seems to only depend on the government 
itself to handle these issues.  
Still, even though the Australian system requires more proactive action from the owners and 
operators, such action may not be easy to achieve. “The Inquiry considers that the manner in 
which PTTEPAA approached the National Offshore Petroleum Authority (NOPSA), the NT 
DoR and the Inquiry itself provides further evidence of the company’s poor governance” 
(Montara Commission, 2010:12). “The information that it provided to the regulators was 
consequently incomplete and apt to mislead” (Montara Commission, 2010:12).  
Also, in the Norwegian system, which is characterized by the mentioned three-party 
cooperation, incidents and accidents still occur. Statoil was not error-free before the 
incident occurred, rather the opposite. The reason why IRIS carried out its study at all was 
due to Statoil's inability to learn from past events. So, why wasn’t the relationship between 
the PSA and the industry flawless, where incidents and accidents do not occur?  
Both Leveson (2004) and the analytical framework emphasized how the hierarchic system 
with government on top sets the boundaries for the next level, in this case the safety 
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management in the different organizations. This involves both permission to drill and the 
regulations established for the industry to follow. Still, an important part of Leveson’s (2004) 
theory is the need for feedback loops. Feedback loops involve how those who are regulated 
communicate with those who establish the regulations, all in an effort to harness the power 
of the hierarchical system so that it is under constant improvement. For the benefit of all 
parties, “[g]overnment must close the existing gap and industry must support rather than 
resist that effort” (National Commission, 2011:vii). 
 “The Inquiry finds that if PTTEPAA had observed its own Well Construction Standards and 
given effect to the various approvals given by the NT DoR, the Blowout is unlikely to have 
occurred” (Montara Commission, 2010:13). “The NT DoR made a major error when it 
approved the Phase 1B Drilling Program in July 2009” (Montara Commission, 2010:13). 
According to the inquiry, this was contrary to best oilfield practices.  
“The American regulation system of the offshore industry is characterized by strong owners 
and employers, where intense lobbying ensured that the industry could continue more or 
less as before, despite a more active regulation. It was no accident, but a strong desire to 
expand oil operations offshore that eventually became essential for the actual public 
regulation of safety offshore” (Ryggvik, 2012:13). 
One of the similarities between all three accidents is that each state profited from this 
industry. In other words, just as management within the organizations must balance the 
need for profit and the development of safety, so must the government. Much of Norway’s 
revenue comes from the oil and gas industry; in fact, Statoil is partly owned by the state of 
Norway.   As the National Commission stated, ”[f]rom birth, MMS had a built-in incentive to 
promote offshore drilling in sharp tension with its mandate to ensure safe drilling and 
environmental protection” (National Commission, 2011:56). It is obvious when you read 
Chapter 3 of this report (National Commission, 2011) that the policies and ideology basically 
encourage the US. When MMS tried to introduce something, it did not receive support, 
either political or financial, from central authorities. In addition, the industry demanded self-
determination. Politicians were on the same side as the industry, with financial gain as a high 
priority and long-term investment in safety a low priority. 
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For the balance between profit and safety to be optimal, “[f]undamental reform will be 
needed in both the structure of those in charge of regulatory oversight and their internal 
decision-making process to ensure their political autonomy, technical expertise, and their 
full consideration of environmental protection concerns” (National Commission, 2011:vii).  
It is important for the regulators to be aware that organizations drift from stage to stage, 
depending on their context, degree of complexity, and how tight/loose the couplings are. 
Regardless of whether or not the regulatory requirements are functional or detailed 
demands, this must be taken into consideration. Changes will occur; therefore, organizations 
need to have a formalized relationship with their regulators to ensure that regulatory 
requirements are also as optimal as possible. When one communicates both how the 
requirements function and how they don’t, a proactive environment in which actors 
communicate with each other can be established to devise the best possible requirements 
and procedures to achieve the best safety outcome for the organizations and still fulfill the 
meaning and intention of the regulatory requirements.  
Of course there would be challenges in the process of determining which rules should be 
considered and how to implement these rules in every region, because although this is a 
global industry we must still take into account the individual differences of each region, both 
culturally and historically. As one can see from the findings in the reports from the Montara 
and the Macondo accidents, the relationship between the regulator and safety management 
was inadequate. In the search to find commonalities across the accidents/incident, the 
Norwegian system does not quite fit the description of a poor or inadequate relationship 
between the regulator and industry/safety management. Perhaps the formal relationship 
among the three parties’ in the Norwegian system is a recipe for other regions to follow. This 
does not mean that the Norwegian cooperation system is perfect, but it might have 
diminished some of the issues the two others confronted. “One could argue that 
participation of the employee representatives that are so central to the Norwegian 
system, has a positive safety impact. Participation is however, a democratic right with an 
intrinsic value that can not be quantified” (Ryggvik, 2012:61). That said, transfer of the 
Norwegian system to other regions might be easier said than done.   
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4.1.6 Section summary 
To sum up, the management system is a key factor in all stages of an organization’s lifespan. 
Management is affected by its relationship with its regulatory regime, and this relationship 
will be reflected in the organization.  
 However, it might be healthy for the organization not to have a micromanagement system, 
as in stage 3 (applied), where subunits might do things a little bit differently, but more 
safely. What’s important in this case is the crucial need for management to have established 
the standards in the design stage. This is essential for establishing how the organization will 
meet and handle challenges that arise in the drifting periods. The system must take into 
consideration all of the stages in the practical drift, approach operations with a collective 
mindfulness, and take into account the long-term approach on costs and benefits. Finally, 
management systems need to take a proactive stand when it comes to changes that occur 
during the lifespan of an organization, which the analytical framework  clearly revealed.  
 
 
4.2 Communication 
 
Communication is complicated and challenging. This discussion addresses how 
communication and different communication systems in all stages of drift, both upward and 
downward, in an organization work to encourage safety. The importance of communication 
is also visible in the different stages of practical drift in that communication is affected by 
the drifting between the different stages. Also, while drifting from stage 4 to stage 1 (the 
redesign stage), how one communicates lessons learned from prior accidents or incidents 
will be discussed.  How did communication affect the occurrence of these accidents and, 
most important, do similarities exist when it comes to communication across the three 
accidents?  
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4.2.1 Multiple organizations – multiple subunits 
Subunits will be developed within all organizations due to different reasons. In this section, 
issues concerning how subunits detach themselves from the organization and drift towards 
failure will be discussed. The discussion revolves around the development of subunits and 
how this affects communication both internally and between organizations and their 
subunits.  
When dealing with the interaction of multiple organizations involved in one operation, there 
is still a need for a management and communication system that handles the cooperation 
and interfaces between the organizations involved. The industry is organized so that  one 
organization is the operator on the platform, but several organizations act as suppliers on 
each platform. At the Deepwater Horizon rig, BP was the operator and Halliburton and 
Transocean (among others) were supplying companies. At the Montara accident, PTTEPAA 
was the operator and Halliburton and West Atlas were involved as supplying companies. 
Also, on the Gullfaks C platform in the North Sea, several organizations were involved: Statoil 
as the operator and, among others, Seawell as a supplier. As the PD model’s stage 2 
illustrates, subunits develop within any organization. However, not only does management 
face the challenge of having subunits within its own organization, it also must deal with 
other organizations that also have subunits. In accordance with Turner (1997) the 
involvement of multiple organizations in a complex work task makes communication even 
harder. As the findings from the different reports have indicated, this will lead to a more 
complex situation with tight couplings where Snook argued the need for a top-down rule-
based logic of action.  
Difficulties with communication between the operator and suppliers are in fact important 
similarities across the three accidents, especially since each organization has its own system, 
its own procedures for how to do things, and its own culture for how and what to 
communicate. This, of course, affects how it can cooperate and communicate. In such cases 
there is a need for a bridging system that that ensure compliance between the different 
systems.  
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At the Macondo blowout, there were obvious communication problems between BP and 
Halliburton. For example, Halliburton was responsible for cementing expertise, but BP made 
crucial decisions about whether to use 15 centralizers without communicating with 
Halliburton. (A centralizer’s function is to place the liner/casing pipe in the middle of the 
drilling hole so that cement on the outside is placed correctly. If the pipe is not positioned 
properly in the middle of the hole, the cement on the outside will not lay properly around 
the pipe. This can lead to the formation of channels in the cement through which oil and gas 
can flow.) (National Commission, 2011). 
The National Commission report clearly argued that among the failures in management and 
training of personnel “…better communication both within and between BP and its 
contractors...” would have prevented the Macondo accident (National Commission, 
2011:122).  BP’s own investigation report indicated communication issues between BP and 
Halliburton when it came to the planning, design, execution, and confirmation of the cement 
job (BP, 2010:33). The Montara inquiry (2010) discovered systemic failures of 
communication between PTTEPAA and Atlas personnel. For example, Atlas was not involved 
in the actual decision during two critical procedures; this reflects a poorly formalized 
relationship/cooperation. These examples are clearly similar to the Gullfaks C incident, and 
the IRIS report stated this in the discussion of sharing knowledge and learning across 
organizations and subunits, the report said that “several of the informants experience Statoil 
as closed and that suppliers have little insight and understanding of the processes that occur 
along the way” (IRIS, 2011:84). As one can see, communication issues were included in 
multiple drift stages, which is consistent with the analytical framework.  
The SINTEF report (2011) after the Macondo blowout stated that regular meetings (weekly) 
between the operator and the drilling-contractor should have been held to ensure safety-
critical issues. Linking this to management issues, there is a need for the operator to be 
much more involved in day-to-day operations. Similar recommendations were also made in 
the two other cases.  
All of the accidents involved issues concerning communication between the organizations 
involved, in both planning and operation stages. In the first stage, the analytical framework 
45 
 
emphasizes the importance of management’s presence, where communication at the top 
level between the organizations needs to set the standard for the rest of the operation. As 
discussed in the management chapter, the design stage is where one plans the whole 
process and operation (and maintenance), and one must delegate different responsibilities, 
processes, and procedures to be used. This is where a rule-based logic of action is needed to 
set the standard for both your own organization as well as for cooperating organizations. For 
this effort to be as successful as possible, communication is essential. Without 
communicating the issues that need to be addressed in this stage, chances are the 
organization will never achieve its goals and it is unlikely to follow the procedures specified. 
As subunits form and drift further away from the rule-based logic of action, communication 
between the different subunits will also drift further away as a natural consequence, and 
this must be taken into account. Something must be done to fill this gap. 
The Norwegian system is characterized by the three-party cooperation between 
management, employees, and the government, which is an important element when it 
comes to communication. In addition, there is also a demand to involve employees in the 
planning or design stage.  Drifting further to the next stages in the model, as the operation 
starts and time passes, subunits arise. When subunits have the time to develop and drift 
further and further away from the rule-based logic of action, communication between the 
different units will be affected and become more challenging. As Westrum put it, “[w]here 
there is lack of dialogue, unpleasant things will happen” (Westrum, 2009:5-8). This might 
have been what happened in the operation of the organizations, which indicates a drift from 
stage 3 to stage 4. Although understanding that something was wrong, the different 
subunits did not manage to get back to a rule-based logic of action to prevent the accident 
from happening and the communication between the subunits was inadequate.  
As the PD model explains, when an organization drifts from stage 3 (applied) to stage 4 
(failed), the different units are forced to assume that others are following and acting in 
accordance with procedures. How can one be certain that this is the case without 
communicating? According to Reason (1997) effective communication is determent for the 
identification and removal of latent pathogens. 
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4.2.2 Lessons learned? 
How to take experiences from past events and learn from them can be essential in how the 
organization develops with respect to both safety and production outcomes.  
Lessons from prior well incidents on the Gullfaks field and other Statoil fields were poorly 
transferred within the Statoil organization. The Gullfaks team did not make use of its own 
expertise in areas such as Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD). The IRIS report (2011) also said 
that Statoil had difficulties involving other organizations in its network of learning. 
The operator (BP) did not share important information with its contractors and the 
contractors did not share important information with BP or each other (Transocean and 
Halliburton). Transocean failed to adequately communicate lessons from an earlier near-
miss to its crew, which had occurred in the North Sea four months earlier.  The National 
Commission stated that one of the recurring themes in these accidents was in fact “failure to 
share information” (National Commission, 2011:ix). 
“PTTEPAA’s records and communication management were defective, particularly the 
exchange of information between on- and offshore personnel, between night and day shifts, 
between offline and online operations, and in relation to milestones such as the installation 
of secondary barriers” (Montara Commission, 2010:10).  
When operating in a high-risk industry like the oil industry, communication is of the essence 
to ensure that everyone has the same understanding of safety-critical issues. The logic of 
action must be consistent with the situation and must be loud and clear to all parties in the 
operation. Without communication, which Champoux (2000) stated involves information 
sharing, feedback, integration, persuasion, emotion, and innovation, organizations have no 
clue whether they have the same view and knowledge of an operation or situation. Without 
equal knowledge about prior lessons learned, the risk of personnel doing something they’re 
not supposed to increases. The IRIS report (2011) stated that the sharing of knowledge 
occurred to a greater extent internally and to a lesser extent between Statoil and suppliers. 
Even within one organization, sharing information and knowledge between installations was 
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also inadequate (IRIS, 2011:83). All of these accidents show that communication failed, 
either inside the organization or in the interface between organizations; either way, the 
principal is the same: There is a need to focus on communication systems to ensure that 
everyone involved has the same information available at all times. This also involves 
knowledge from previous accidents such as the accident at Snorre A and former incidents at 
Montara VHP.  
4.2.3 Report systems 
Report systems are one part of communication channels in an organization. This discussion 
shows how parts of the communication system fail and can affect the development of 
unwanted events. 
At Gullfaks C, there were also issues about messages of concern, or the feedback/reporting 
system. When employees saw that things weren’t as they were supposed to be, they faced a 
sub-optimal system for handling their concerns. Any system for reporting must be available, 
easy to handle, addressed to the appropriate authority, and dealt with. Although there 
seems to have been a low threshold for reporting in multiple ways, either information still 
did not reach management or management did not respond to the messages of concern. 
The IRIS report (2011) revealed this problem and concluded that no matter who was right 
the feedback and reporting system were not optimal. The report system is, of course, an 
essential part of the communication system. The reason for a low threshold for reporting 
might be attributed to the three-party system in Norway, where organizational actors not 
only have the ability to state their concerns, they also have a duty to speak out if they sense 
that something is wrong (Arbeidsmiljøloven, 2005:§2-3). 
In contrast, both the Australian and US systems differ from the Norwegian in this area. 
However, even though the Norwegian system facilitates a reporting system, through both 
laws and regulations, either the system itself was not sufficient to ensure that messages of 
concern reached the right authority and/or the authority did not act upon those messages. 
In other words, it is not enough to have regulations in place; one needs to act in accordance 
with them. This requires a rule-based logic of action where everyone knows how to report 
and to whom, and feels assured that those receiving the messages act upon them. According 
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to the analytical framework, this again shows how different stages affect the logic of action 
within an organization. As mentioned earlier, employees, especially in the Norwegian 
system, are involved in the planning process. However, as time passes and operations 
continue, the demand for employee involvement and reporting still applies. The fact that 
organizational actors drift away from this rule-based logic of action and toward a task-based 
logic of action might also affect the degree to which actors actually report and how the 
management system responds to the reports. According to Tinmannsvik (2008), silent 
deviation arises. Actors do things a little bit differently and adjust how they proceed. Instead 
of proactively reporting issues of concern involving a task, they solve the problem within 
their subunit using a task-based logic of action. This might be the right way to address a 
specific task, but it must not become standard. Consistent with Reason (1997), adequate 
reporting systems and culture are essential in achieving a safety culture.  
4.2.4 Lack of documentation 
How to document important discussions and decisions is also an important part of the 
organization's communication system. This section discusses how important written 
documents can be in eliminating failures.  
 At Gullfaks C, there were indications of trouble during the whole process, from the planning 
stage through the incident happening; however, no action was taken. Thus, it is obvious that 
the communication systems did not work as they were supposed to, either from a sender’s 
perspective or from a receiver’s perspective.  Communication problems at the Gullfaks C 
platform also included scant documentation of discussions held in different meetings, which 
clearly affects how one can communicate what has been discussed (IRIS, 2011). How one 
documents discussions in protocols or otherwise is part of an organization’s communication 
system.  The challenge is that only those participating in the meetings are certain to have 
received the required information. If important information is left out and not written down, 
how can one be certain that the information will reach the relevant organizations and 
persons involved? At Gullfaks C, it seems that it has been a tradition not to document the 
discussion from different meetings; only the conclusions seem to fit in the protocols. As the 
IRIS report (2011) from the Gullfaks C accident showed, a discussion of whether to cement 
well C06 or not was held. In addition, whether one should drill in one or two sections was 
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discussed. These essential discussions were not recorded in any documents, which excluded 
important elements in this operation. When discussions, objections, proposed amendments, 
and similar items are not written down, those who did not participate in the meetings might 
think that there were no problems. This is one of the issues Turner (1997) promoted as an 
information problem, where “there is always someone who knew.” 
Like in the Gullfaks C incident, the protocols were not detailed at the Deepwater Horizon rig; 
“…it does not appear that BP’s team tried to determine before April 15 whether additional 
centralizers would be needed” (National Commission, 2011:116). The inquiry did not state 
directly whether or not this was discussed in prior meetings, but the report stated that BP 
and its contractors must have “…decision making protocols of the many different contractors 
involved in drilling a deepwater well” (National Commission, 2011:122). Inadequate 
protocols for safety-critical issues that had been discussed meant that critical information 
was not transmitted to everyone, and certainly not to Halliburton. After the accident on 
Montara, one of the recommendations made by the inquiry concerned the issues around 
documentation. ”Relevant personnel from licensees and rig operators should meet face to 
face to agree on, and document, well control issues/arrangements prior to commencement 
of drilling operations” (Montara Commission, 2010:358). 
 
As part of an adequate communication system, protocols for safety-critical issues should be 
included. This industry should require a better protocol system with its work form, with shift 
work (night/day), and with personnel on- and offshore. To ensure that everyone involved 
receives information from safety-critical discussions is important, even though those in the 
meetings might have found solutions to potential problems or decided to discard a potential 
problem.  
In addition to adequate protocols, and as an example to how organizations can be affected 
by their regulator, the extent of required documentation of management systems varies. 
Ryggvik (2012) discussed the difference between the Norwegian and US systems in relation 
to this which clearly reflects the characteristics of the various systems. A group of 
organizations in the US Offshore Drilling Industry showed their clear “resistance against 
MMS attempts to facilitate that the companies' management systems should be 
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documented so that these could be regulated and inspected, as were the case in the 
Norwegian system. The companies used the improvements in injury and lost time injury (LTI) 
statistics to indicate that they did not need further regulation” (Ryggvik, 2012:69). Once 
again, one can see that the relationship between the regulator and the regulated will affect 
how well the organizations to their job, in this case the degree of documentation.  
The same issues that were discussed regarding the report system are also valid when it 
comes to the discussion of protocols and written documentation; how thorough the 
documentation of discussions is might differ as the organization drifts through different 
stages. This again shows the link between the management system and the different stages, 
especially the importance in the design stage of having a clear procedure regarding how 
safety-critical discussions and assessments are to be protocoled.  
4.2.5 Section summary 
Adequate communication systems is an important tool to bridge the gap between subunits 
and between subunits and its organization in order for them not to drift away from the 
organization or detach themselves from the rule based logic of action.  
There were obvious difficulties with communication and information transmission in all of 
the accidents. One of the issues in all three accidents was that multiple organizations were 
involved. When more than one organization is involved, communication will be more 
challenging than if there is only one responsible organization at each well. On the other 
hand, this is how this industry is organized, by multiple organizations involved on one rig and 
on most operations.  Dealing with others is something the industry must do; however, 
organizing in a way that fosters cooperation depends on adequate communication systems. 
Therefore, cooperation on multiple levels is a necessity in this type of industry. 
The communication difficulties in these accidents were not one dimensional. Since 
communication is a way of acting, a way of cooperating, and a way of getting what you want, 
difficulties with communication arose in different situations, at different levels, at different 
times, and between different people/roles/organizations. How the organizations drift from 
stage to stage clearly complicates the communication and sharing of information.  The 
industry must take a closer look at its communication systems, including the state of the 
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procedures and systems for good and effective communication where a low threshold for 
reporting exists.  
Sharing safety-critical information is essential. As Turner (1997) stated, issues concerning 
communication can be found in every organization; therefore, one cannot say that problems 
with communication mean that accidents will occur. On the other hand, both Turner and the 
findings of this thesis show that communication issues are part of the cause of these 
accidents. Communication seems to be an issue that one doesn’t address explicitly, that is 
more or less taken for granted. Communication is an organizational factor that needs to be 
addressed more systematically to prevent accidents. Without a proper communication 
system, essential parts of the organization are being neglected. 
Explicit communication and a proactive approach to silent deviations are important 
elements in avoiding drifting from stage 3 to a stage 4. This also demands the management 
controls and systems established in the design stage and a proactive management that 
observes its operation and how the systems are working. This again depends on open 
communication, upward and downward, to achieve the best possible safety outcome. 
Depending on which stage an organization is in, management needs to make sure that 
everyone has the same understanding of both the stage they’re in and what type of strategy 
that is needed, a task-based or a rule-based logic of action 
4.3 Procedures 
 
Procedures are important elements in a rule-based logic of action. This discussion mainly 
revolves around the importance of adequate procedures for the whole process; procedures 
developed in the design stage affect drifting in the organization. Also, they affect how one 
might be forced to not act in accordance with procedures and move the organization toward 
failure.  
Since procedures involve procedures for competence, appropriate management, 
communication, and other areas, challenges related to the procedures involve how they are 
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created, who establishes them, on which ground they are established, how they work, and 
how they are followed up over the lifetime of the organization.  
Procedures are a central element within the analytical framework. Procedures are 
established by the industry and/or organizations themselves as a way to meet regulatory 
requirements or internal standards. The different cultures in the different regions studied in 
this thesis will, of course, affect how one develops these procedures and how they are 
implemented. While the Norwegian system is characterized by three-party involvement, the 
US system by the operators’ strong role in self-determination, and the Australian system by 
cooperation between the state as an inspection authority and the operators, some 
differences will, of course, exist.  At the same time, when taking a closer look at how 
procedures work by using the analytical framework, some similarities also can be seen.  
4.3.1 Lack of adequate procedures 
Poor transfer of experience and poor communication might indicate weaknesses in 
procedures. Even though the PSA report (2010) did not state this, the research conducted by 
IRIS (2011) indicated failures in procedures concerning risk assessment, especially in how the 
organization did or did not learn from previous accidents such as on the Snorre A platform. 
How were the procedures for transferring key learning points from one rig to another? Also, 
the failure to involve the MPD might indicate a failure in procedures over whom to involve in 
different operations. Frustration over complicated and to some degree misleading 
procedures established by management might also be a cause of why personnel develop 
their own local ways of doing things. The IRIS report clearly stated the frustration among 
employees about these issues; “[c]ontrolling documents are perceived as complex and 
difficult to deal with” (IRIS, 2011:108). 
The National Commission’s inquiry report cited in several places inadequate procedures, a 
lack of procedures, and in some cases a failure to train personnel in accordance with 
established procedures. This included procedures such as the performance and 
interpretation of the negative pressure testing of the cement (National Commission, 
2011:135), management of change, risk analysis, and peer reviews (National Commission, 
2011:125). 
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At the Montara well accident, the most prominent cause was inadequate procedures.  The 
inquiry found that procedures were poor and deviant and, at best, ambiguous. The inquiry 
after the Montara well accident clearly identified the lack of adequate procedures within 
PTTEPAA and suggested that these shortcomings in the company’s procedures led directly to 
the blowout (Montara Inquiry, 2010:6).  
 Both the WOMP and Well Construction Standards (WCS) were inadequate; one example of 
this is the lack of procedures regarding how PTTEPAA would address risk. That many 
“PTTEPAA employees and contractors interpreted aspects of the WCS differently illustrates 
the ambiguity and inappropriateness of the WCS” (Montara Commission, 2010:9). 
As one can see, failures in procedures for risk assessment and for involving the right 
personnel are commonalities across the accidents/incident. However, failures in procedures 
differed from accident to accident. This might have something to do with the relationship 
between the regulator and organization, organizational culture, and other organization-
specific aspects. The Montara accident report clearly identified the lack of appropriate 
procedures as one of its main findings. The IRIS (2011) research after the Gullfaks C incident 
identified issues concerning procedures, and even though PSA did not explicitly state this as 
a prominent cause, it can still be read out of both the PSA (2010) and IRIS (2011) reports 
concerning this incident. Also, at Macondo, inadequate procedures, especially concerning 
risk assessment and how to handle changes in an operation, were deficient. 
4.3.2 Regulatory regimes’ effect on the development of procedures 
Regarding the Macondo accident, the relationship between the regulatory regime and the 
industry is an interesting aspect of how well the procedures were designed and followed. 
Since the organizations claimed independence and self-determination, it appears that the 
MMS and the organizations did not see eye to eye about the functions of the different 
procedures. At Gullfaks C issues concerning the relationship between the regulator and 
Statoil were discussed. “It has been developed a practice where it occurs a state of 
emergency in the affected part of the organization when PSA comes with its orders after 
events. ‘Everyone’ must put everything else aside and concentrate on developing and 
implementing measures in order to close the PSA’s orders” (IRIS, 2011:90).  
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One can clearly see the link among regulatory regime, safety management, and the work 
process in the forms of procedures; how they are designed and how well they work is 
affected by the relationship between the regulator and the regulated.  As is the case at 
Gullfaks C, when subunits are more or less forced to drop what they are doing in order to 
fulfill the new requirements set by PSA, shortcuts will be taken and the drifting towards 
failure will occur. One is now drifting away from the rule-based logic of action where you 
follow procedures, towards taking the shortcuts needed to fulfill the new ones. Even if the 
orders set by PSA are intended to increase safety, in worst case the opposite will happen as a 
result to the shortcuts being made.  
As BP’s own inquiry stated, “When well influx occurs, rapid response is critical. The rig crew 
needs effective procedures and must effectively implement them to maintain control over 
deteriorating conditions in the well” (BP, 2010:43).  
The relationships or interaction between the regulatory regimes and the organization, the 
macro level, ultimately affected the meso level within organizations, or how one followed 
the procedures.  
While the US system has been characterized by a strong lobbying industry where self-
determination has been an important principle, regulators have had minor or little real 
impact on the industry. The Norwegian system, on the other hand, has had a culture of 
cooperation with three-party involvement where all parties have both a duty and the 
privilege to contribute. The Australian system is characterized by functional but complicated 
sets of demands and regulations where the employer is established as the only responsible 
party. One can almost say that the Australian system consists of parts of both the Norwegian 
and the US system.  
 
4.3.3 The importance of designing procedures 
Despite the differences in procedures across the accidents/incident, important similarities 
still existed. Those similarities concerned the intention to even have procedures at all. 
Procedures are supposed to be helpful tools in fulfilling regulations and rules set by the 
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government and the industry or organizations themselves, not the cause of ambiguity. As 
stage 1 (design) in the practical drift shows, there is a need for safety management to take 
the steps concerning the choice of procedures seriously; this is where management plans 
and designs the operation, using mindfulness to foresee what might go wrong and how to 
correct course if the organization is drifting in that direction. As the analysis framework also 
shows, the drifting process over the lifetime of an organization, where it goes from tight to 
loose coupling and has differing degrees of complexity, affects the occurrence of subunits 
and how they actually execute their jobs. How well one follows procedures within this 
drifting process varies from the rule-based to the task-based logic of action. However, 
without the foundation of a good rule-based logic of action, a task-based logic of action 
might drift even further away from the intent of the procedures than this model itself even 
considers. On some level, subunits might even be “forced” to devise their own way of doing 
things to operate safely because of inadequate procedures. For example, the Montara 
accident report clearly stated that “Well Construction Standards were at best ambiguous 
and open to different interpretations” (Montara Commission, 2010:9). Different units 
interpreted standards differently. If the organization has not implemented functioning 
procedures and a culture for reporting, openness, and communication, the actual way of 
doing things might drift far away from how management thinks personnel are doing things. 
Even though management is responsible for the whole operation, how can it be held 
responsible when it does not know what is happening within its own organization and 
operation? As the IRIS report (2011) stated, management had the impression that 
procedures were followed no matter what, but responses from personnel indicated the 
opposite; they felt that the procedures were complicated and not that easy to comply with. 
During a drift from stage3 to stage 4 (failed), if the subunits do not manage to shift back 
from a task-based logic of action to a rule-based logic of action, accidents can happen.  
The process of shifting back to a rule-based logic of action at the appropriate time might be 
harder when the procedures created in the design stage are initially inadequate. This notion 
was supported by how the organizations did not manage to transfer critical learning points 
from previous accidents/incidents, how someone at the Gullfaks C did not manage to involve 
the staff with the right competence, how one at the Macondo site did not manage to 
properly consider the risk due to changes, and how one at the Montara site initially did not 
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create adequate procedures at all. All this occurred after management failed to implement 
appropriate and efficient procedures in the design stage. 
4.3.4 Section summary 
The relationships between the regulatory regimes and the industry have an effect on how 
management designs and implements procedures within its organization and how well the 
procedures will function and be implemented by personnel. The relationship at the macro 
level sets the foundation for the healthy development of procedures and how to comply 
with rules and regulations – sort of a culture bearer. Even the Norwegian system, which 
involves all parties, is not flawless; no system is. However, one of the key successes is that 
there exists a relationship and dialogue among the regulators, the employers, and the 
employees. Even though the relationship might not be perfect, the intention of it is well 
respected and lies as a foundation for safe operations in the industry. The degree of 
involvement from the different parties is not pertinent to this thesis but might make for an 
interesting discussion for later research. However, what is part of the conclusion in this 
section is the need for the involvement of all three parties so as to develop procedures that 
are respected and complied with to achieve operational safety. In this lies what has already 
been discussed in the communication chapter, the importance of a proactive stand to 
change procedures if necessary to avoid the dangerous drift from stage 3 to stage 4.  
 
4.4 Competence 
 
The competence personnel possess is crucial. This part will therefore discuss the need for 
the right competence and how this was or was not ensured by the organizations.  
Like procedures are tools on multiple issues concerning organizations and how to get things 
done, competence is the main resource in an organization – the people performing the 
actual jobs.  
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4.4.1 Crucial decision made by the wrong people 
Statoil did not use the appropriate competence in key processes. “A dedicated risk 
coordinator responsible for risk management was never appointed, and the group 
conducting the operational risk assessments lacked the necessary expertise to conduct 
proper risk analyses” (PSA, 2010:4). Personnel lacking skills or expertise were responsible for 
analyses and making key decisions and these decisions included the failure to use MPD 
expertise for the MPD operation. There was a change in organizational structure (the merger 
between Statoil and Hydro) and the replacement of personnel (a lot of people with great 
experience left the organization and there was insufficient transfer of knowledge). No one 
managed to transfer knowledge between former and forthcoming human 
resources/competence at Gullfaks (IRIS, 2011:110)  
In addition to failures in the management decision-making process and communication, both 
within BP and between BP and its cooperating organizations, “…training of key engineering 
and rig personnel would have prevented the accident at the Macondo well” (National 
Commission, 2011:122). BP (2010) itself stated that lack of competence was one of the 
issues that caused this accident. Management failed to ensure that personnel fully 
considered the risks in the operation/work task. For example, during the negative pressure 
test of the cementing, several issues related to competence and procedures were 
inadequate. Neither BP nor Transocean had procedures for running or interpreting the 
negative pressure test, nor had they trained their personnel to do so (National Commission, 
2011:119). (The negative pressure test was used as one of the testing methods to ensure 
that the barrier of the cement was adequate.)  
PTTEPAA’s senior personnel had only limited experience with batch drilling and batch 
tieback operations. By failing to test all barriers properly, PTTEPAA’s personnel on the rig 
demonstrated inadequate understanding of the company’s WCS. They also failed to 
comprehend the manifest problems in the cementing job for the 9-⅝” casing shoe (Montara 
Commission, 2010).  
Once again, the importance of having a well-planned recruitment strategy in the design 
stage might be crucial to the rest of the drift over the lifetime of an organization. When the 
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work is executed, management needs the right competence at each concrete work task. 
Competence includes education, knowledge, and experience – both explicit and tacit. The 
competence the management has within its organizations will determine how well the 
organization undergoes the drifting process and how subunits are developed and 
function/dysfunction, including how well one shifts from rule-based to task-based logic of 
action when the situation demands it.  
In these two accidents and one incident, it seems that failures in all of the stages 
developed―from the design stage of strategy and recruitment, to how personnel developed 
their subunits, to how personnel did not manage to shift from a task-based logic of action to 
a rule-based logic of action when needed. Ultimately, what caused these accidents were 
wrong decisions made by people without the competence to make them. A statement that 
supports this assertion was taken from the National Commission report: “…individuals often 
found themselves making critical decisions without a full appreciation for the context (or 
even without recognizing that the decisions were critical)” (National Commission, 2011:123). 
At some point, employees can, by a rule-based logic of action, do their work in a satisfying 
way, but this will only take the organization so far. In stage 3 (applied), this might in fact be 
the best and safest path. To be creative and develop a task-based logic of action when the 
situation demands it, as in stage 3, organizations need a competence that corresponds to 
the situational task. This is also stated in the National Commission report: “[i]t takes good 
experienced personnel to understand the situation and cope with it” (National Commission, 
2011:44). Then again, to have the ability to go back to the rule-based logic of action when 
that is demanded, just tacit knowledge and task-based practice will not be sufficient. 
Management must also set competence to be in second position and do what is demanded 
in a rule-based logic of action to follow established procedures. This will ensure that 
everyone knows exactly how to perform and exactly what others are supposed to do. Again, 
one can see the importance of having appropriate procedures for competence to be used in 
the best possible way to achieve operational safety and avoid accidents or incidents.  
As Nordhaug (2007) stated, having the right competence might be a determinant to 
surviving competition in the market. As can be seen from these two accidents and one 
incident, there are some crucial commonalities showing that possession of the right 
59 
 
competence is in fact crucial. Common to all of the three is the fact that personnel without 
the proper skills or expertise made critical decisions both in planning and in operation. In 
addition, failure to detect and address safety-critical issues and risk assessments arose.  
The lack of staff competence at the Montara operation was obvious. Still, even though not as 
obvious, competence played a key role in the other accidents as well. Competence and 
knowledge about operations, procedures, and other elements depend on personnel’s 
experience, training, and education. How personnel perceive a possible hazard depends on 
their competence and knowledge. Looking at this through a structuralist’s perspective, the 
organization can do something about how it wants its staff to perceive risk and deal with it 
by having a good recruitment strategy, training programs, and procedures and guidelines.  
On the Gullfaks C platform, IRIS found several shortcomings in terms of competence; 
“[t]here is little doubt that the combination of lack of MPD skills, poor coordination and 
uncertainty regarding new teams, and the fact that people with high skills and long 
experience had been early retired, gave instability” (IRIS, 2011:100). In addition, IRIS also 
stated that some of the units were loosely coupled to the organization; even Gullfaks C itself 
was considered a somewhat loosely coupled unit in Statoil’s installations.  According to the 
analytical framework, this created greater risk for something to go wrong, especially if 
subunits were performing with a task-based logic of action when they really should have 
been following a rule-based logic of action. The chance for subunits to actually perform 
according to the rule-based logic of action was low, since both Gullfaks C and subunits within 
the platform seemed to be loosely coupled to the rest of the organization.  
After the Macondo accident, BP (2010) also did its own inquiry. One of the main findings was 
that competence is essential and needs to be addressed more thoroughly. The guidelines for 
the negative-pressure test, a critical activity, did not specify expected bleed volumes or 
success/failure criteria. Therefore, effective performance of the test relied on the 
competency and leadership skills of the BP and Transocean rig leaders (BP, 2010:41). Both 
the rig crew and the well site leader were expected to know how to perform the test.   
“On the Macondo well, the rig crew apparently did not recognize significant indications of 
hydrocarbon influx during the displacement of the riser to seawater” (BP, 2010:41). A 
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fundamental requirement for a safe operation is to prevent influx of hydrocarbons in the 
well. In BP’s own investigation report, one of the recommendation chapters for further 
developments contained several bullet points that focused on competence within the 
organization and how to ensure the right competence in the supplying organizations (BP, 
2010). 
The development of subunits is a natural consequence of the way this industry is organized, 
by separation of functions; the hiring of Halliburton as a specialist in cement is a good 
example. Separation of functions is necessary to achieve specialized expertise in certain 
fields, but this also implies the development of subunits.  
 
4.4.2 Section summary 
Apparently, compliance, procedures, and competence affect each other. The fact that the 
organizations had inadequate procedures caused, according to the analytical model and the 
findings in the reports, the different subunits to develop a task-based logic of action. In an 
organization that does not possess optimal competence, like in all of these cases, the 
development of a task-based logic of action leads to higher risk for incidents and accidents.  
The staffs’ competence in a high-risk industry is of utmost importance. Improving awareness 
and the ability to detect and react to early warnings in lack of control is critical; this was 
stated in the SINTEF (2011) report after the Macondo accident, but the concept clearly is 
transferable to each of the involved organizations as a general recommendation.  
  
4.5 Compliance 
 
The different logics of action will affect how the subunits and organizations comply with 
both internal and external requirements. In the discussion of procedures and competence, 
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compliance was a key factor because it involves how personnel comply with procedures and 
requirements.  
4.5.1 Unrocked boat 
As discussed in the procedures chapter, the procedures themselves were not, according to 
PSA (2010), a significant reason for the occurrence of the incident, but compliance was an 
issue. While planning the well, risk analyses were not carried out in accordance with Statoil’s 
own requirements and guidelines. Despite the fact that the well was of a complex nature 
and represented a significant risk, only basic risk analysis methods were applied. PSA (2010) 
also identified a lack of knowledge and compliance with governing documents, as well as 
inadequate deviation treatment procedures. This included a lack of knowledge about risk 
management guidelines and quality assurance methods, as well as uncertainty regarding the 
interpretation of key concepts. Furthermore, deficiencies in documentation of the decision-
making process were identified as prominent. This included little documentation for key 
decisions made in meetings and failure to use the Change Log, in addition to an absence of 
reproduction of deadlines, responsible personnel, and signatures in documents.  
At the Macondo accident, several separate missteps and crucial elements lacked proper 
compliance, including that the cement was not adequately tested by the personnel on the 
rig. The Deepwater Horizon rig was reckoned by BP to be one of its safest rigs (Ryggvik, 
2012). To draw a parallel to Reason’s (1997) theory about the unrocked boat, this might be 
part of the explanation of how BP, as well as the organizations in the other accidents, could 
have failed to focus more on safety-critical issues. Significant time had passed since its last 
serious incident and the constant pressure for productivity and profit may have contributed 
to the disastrous situations; “[i]t is easy to forget to fear things that rarely happen, 
particularly in the face of productive imperatives such as growth, profit and market share” 
(Reason, 1997:6).  
Although PTTEPAA’s procedures themselves were inadequate, the company’s personnel on 
the rig demonstrated a manifestly inadequate understanding of their content and 
knowledge of what they required. In fact, the inquiry discovered that none of the Montara 
wells (5) complied with the company’s WCS.  
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In the analytical framework, compliance is linked to safety management and the PD process. 
This shows how the day-to-day organization actually acts in accordance with safety 
management and how this shift depends on the stage the organization is in. It also includes 
how safety management complies with the different stages in the practical drift.  The reason 
for not complying with procedures and shifting to a rule-based logic of action when the 
situation demands it might have something to do with the Reason’s (1997) unrocked boat 
theory, where one does not manage to shift to the right logic of action because one has 
drifted so far away from imagining the possibility for accidents to actually occur. Compliance 
is, of course, closely tied to the logic of action because compliance with procedures involves 
acting in accordance with a rule-based logic of action. Then again, as mentioned, this might 
not always be possible, as in the engineered stage where one might think that compliance 
and following a rule-based logic of action is not the best and safest way to act. At this stage, 
one might demand, unconsciously, that the competence of personnel in the subunits needs 
to comply with their own task-based logic of action to operate more safely and efficiently. 
When it comes to these accidents/incident, the way in which rules and procedures were 
complied with emerged in all stages. How they were complied with in the design stage 
clearly affected the rest of the operation process and how personnel felt almost forced to do 
things that were not in compliance with the organization’s procedures. 
4.5.2 Complying with regulators’ requirements 
An important aspect of compliance is how one manages to comply with all of the 
requirements established by the regulators and how this might affect the drifting towards 
failure. Regardless of whether the requirements are detailed or function based, they are still 
requirements that need to be acted upon.  
As discussed, the Norwegian system has a framework and function-based set of 
requirements where how the organizations comply with them is more or less up to the 
organizations. The US system has a large number of detailed requirements that must be 
fulfilled and the Australian system is more function-based, but still has complicated and 
comprehensive requirements.  
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How the regulators organize their requirements and expectations of the organizations will 
also affect how well the procedures set by management function and how well they are 
complied with by the organization’s subunits.  
After an incident or accident, the regulator will also investigate and establish requirements. 
At least, this is the case in Norway and the US. In Australia, the regulator does not give 
instructions or orders, but makes recommendations to the Ministry.  
The point being made in this section is that these requirements after investigations are often 
time-limited and come as additional requirements on top of the requirements organizations 
already have. This can lead the organizations and their subunits to feel more or less forced 
to take shortcuts to meet the requirements. These shortcuts can cut across what was 
intended. The move here is from a rule-based logic of action to a task-based logic of action, 
where shortcuts offer the solution to meeting the requirements within specified deadlines. 
As the practical drift demonstrates, this is when the risks gets higher and dangerous events 
can occur in the moving towards failure. 
“Everyone must put everything else aside and concentrate on developing and implementing 
measures to help close the PSA's orders” (IRIS, 2011:90). 
4.5.3 Section summary 
This section has offered additional discussion of how the organizations and their subunits 
have complied with requirements and procedures. How one complies depends on how 
adequate the procedures are in the first place and how the drifting process from one stage 
to another clearly has an effect on how well organizations comply with the rule-based logic 
of action. This compliance is more or less determined by how adequate the procedures feel 
for the subunits and whether they feel forced to use their own logic of action and drift 
toward the failure stage.  
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5.0 Conclusion 
 
This research demonstrated how important organizational factors are in an organization’s 
drift from stage to stage to end up in failure. This thesis contributes to understanding how 
an increasing focus on key organizational factors (management, communication, 
competence, procedures, and compliance) helps in understanding how accidents in the 
offshore drilling industry can occur. These are essential issues that offshore drilling 
organizations need to address sooner rather than later. Even though one can claim that 
technical problems are the direct cause of an accident, there is a need to determine the 
potential for how a focus on organizational factors can eliminate or at least reduce the 
chances for technical failure because problems would be detected sooner, handled more 
properly, and eventually eliminated.  
What the discussion in this thesis has shown is how the different factors also interact with 
each other and both affect and are affected by the practical drift process over the lifespan of 
an organization. The nature of relationships between organizations and their regulatory 
regimes also represents a key finding and an issue that needs to be thoroughly addressed by 
the industry.  
How can organizations manage and communicate to avoid accidents such as these in the 
future? How do organizations secure the right type of competence for each job and work 
task? How can personnel organize their way through safety procedures so that the 
procedures are optimal for offshore drilling operations from a global perspective? How do 
organizations secure compliance between what they should do and what they actually do? 
Lessons can definitely be learned from these accidents and, in addition, this thesis aims to 
suggest in-common underlying organizational factors found across the accidents/incident, 
which hopefully will provide an even deeper understanding of how accidents like these can 
occur.   
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As has been shown in this thesis, no system alone is completely reliable when it comes to 
preventing accidents. We have discussed different regulatory regimes and at least three 
different ways of organizing - and still accidents have happened. The industry needs to keep 
this in mind going forward, always knowing the latent potential that something might go 
wrong. Only then will the industry be on the alert to do what is in its power to prevent 
accidents from occurring. Reason (1997) described this as the principle of the unrocked boat, 
Snook (2000) as the practical drift. It is essential to address the five organizational factors 
described here because these factors are considered barriers for preventing accidents from 
happening.  
It is hoped that this thesis has made a contribution to the prevention of offshore drilling 
accidents. Further research should be undertaken with the intent to provide an even deeper 
understanding of how the underlying organizational factors affect the development of 
offshore drilling accidents. 
This study has emphasized the importance of recognizing that an organization is always in 
motion, with different contexts and different degrees of couplings and complexity. It is only 
when organizations are aware of and acknowledge this fact that they can organize 
themselves in a safer way, without the effort affecting production and income in a significant 
way. Organizations must understand themselves and their subunits they must reduce the 
distance between various parties involved in the offshore drilling industry. Organizations 
must be willing to share learning points from past events, both internally and externally. 
They also have to increase their focus on communication's role in this important work. 
Organizations operate in different stages and must therefore have a proactive attitude 
toward the various subunits’ ways of performing, which may require revision of current 
procedures. To encourage compliance with procedures and other requirements, the 
procedures and requirements must be meaningful and easy to understand for those 
executing them. This means that management must involve all the relevant parties in the 
design of these procedures and requirements, precisely to ensure a common understanding 
of what is needed and how to work to achieve internal and external goals in a competitive 
industry.  
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